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ABSTRACT
THE COMPOSITION & FUNCTIONING OF
THE TURKISH CORPORATE BOARDS:
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY
BY
DENİZ AKTUĞ
SUPERVISOR: ASSOC. PROF. OĞUZ N. BABÜROĞLU
MARCH 1994
This study focuses on the composition and functioning of the Turkish corporate boards 
to better understand the roles undertaken by the boards while steering the companys’ into 
the future. The research sample consists of 20 organizations that include 9 holdings, 3 
joint ventures, 4 small firms, and 4 independent cases. These independent cases refer to 
those organizations that do not fit into any of the subgroups listed above. The results are 
based on the responses of the board members to the open-ended questions during 30-40 
minute interviews. The comparative evaluation and discussion of the observed board 
practices in each subgroup are presented in full detail. The compatibility of the findings 
with the research perspectives used in previous studies are pointed out. In spite of the 
limited sample size, the findings enable the generation of valuable research hypotheses 
which can be tested by more extensive studies in the future.
ÖZET
TÜRKİYE’DE ANONİM ŞİRKET 
YÖNETİM KURULLARININ 
BİLEŞİMİ VE İŞLEYİŞİ 
ÜZERİNE DENEYSEL BİR ÇALIŞMA
DENİZ AKTUĞ
Yüksek Lisans Tezi, İşletme Enstitüsü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Oğuz N. Babüroğlu
Bu çalışma, Türkiye’de anonim şirket yönetim kurullarmm şirket geleceğini 
etkilemekteki rollerini daha iyi anlayabilmek amacıyla, bu tarz şirketlerdeki yönetim 
kurullannın bileşimi ve işleyişleri üzerinde durmaktadır. 9’u holding, 3’ü ortak girişim, 4’ü 
küçük firma ve 4’ü de bağımsız vaka olmak üzere toplam 20 organizasyon ele alınmıştır. 
Bağımsız vakalar, diğer gruplann hiç birine dahil edilemeyen firmalan içerir. Sonuçlar, bu 
organizasyonların yönetim kurulu üyeleri ile yapılan 30-40 dakikalık mülakatlardan elde 
edilen bilgilere dayandınimıştır. Her gruptaki şirketlerdeki yönetim kurulu uygulamalan 
ve bu uygulamalann karşılaştırmak değerlendirmeleri detaylı olarak sunulmuştur. 
Bulgulann önceki çalışmalarda kullanılan araştırma perspektiflerine uyumluluğu da 
tartışılmıştır. Kullanılan örnekleme grubunun kısıtlı büyüklüğüne rağmen, bu çalışmadan 
elde edilen bulgular, gelecekte yürütülebilecek daha geniş kapsamlı çalışmalara ışık tutacak 
bir takım hipotezlerin geliştirilmesini olası kılmıştır.
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I. INTRODUCTION
As the family businesses are gradually replaced by publicly owned enterprises, 
board of directors is perceived as a bridge and mediator between the company 
top management and the stockholders. Effective boards are expected to
• ensure and strengthen the firm’s relations with its environment,
• contribute to the formulation of the firm’s mission, goals and objectives,
• provide counseling service to the top management in the generation and 
evaluation of the strategic alternatives,
• monitor the company and CEO performance and check the conformity of the 
top management decisions with the stockholders’ long range profitability,
• analyze the impact of the top management decisions on the survival, 
profitability and the image of the company, raise criticisms and apply 
sanctions where necessary.
Numerous empirical studies conducted in US have indicated that effective and 
participative boards contribute to the improvement of the company performance.
In spite of the critical and ever increasing importance of the subject in the 
corporate world, research that has been conducted on the nature and performance 
of the Turkish boards has remained rather limited. We strongly believe in the 
benefits of an empirical research that will first create a comprehensive database 
about the typology of the Turkish boards and then test the validity of the 
proposed relationship between board involvement and the company 
performance. The findings of such a study are expected to contribute the 
evolution of duty conscious boards that not only support and counsel but also 
monitor top management performance and ensure that the company activities are 
conducted in conformity with the shareholders’ interest. These findings, in turn, 
will enable the derivation of guidelines for the adoption of a more participative 
and informed management approach.
This study can be perceived as the initial phase of such a comprehensive effort. 
The results are based on the interviews conducted with the board members of 
twenty organizations. Although accessibility of the directors has played a 
significant role in the constitution of the sample, special care has been shown to 
include organizations that are different in size, stock ownership structure, field 
and scope of the business activities.
The first section of this paper summarizes four perspectives that have guided 
the research on the board of directors. As the discussion unfolds, both the flaws 
and the complementary nature of the arguments become more apparent, leading 
us to an integrative model, based on Zahra and Pearce (1989).
The second section provides a full description of this integrative model, listing 
its virtues over the four partial approaches discussed before. This integrative 
perspective is then used to group and discuss the findings of the past research on 
the board of directors. These previous studies are critically evaluated, compared 
and contrasted. The reasons underlying the contradictions in the findings are 
sought.
The third section discusses the scope and methodology of this exploratory 
research. It provides an introduction to the research sample. A comprehensive 
list of the open ended questions used is also provided.
The forth section includes a short summary of the related articles of the 
Turkish Law of Commerce, together with their interpretations. Next, detailed 
descriptions pertaining to the structure and functioning of the boards of the 
organizations examined are provided. These organizations are divided into sub­
groups and examined on the basis of the variables of the integrative model.
The last section evaluates the findings of the study and proposes content and 
methodology related guidelines for future research.
II. RESEARCH PERSPECTIVES ON THE ROLES OF 
BOARD OF DIRECTORS
Four distinct theoretical perspectives have shaped the research on the roles of 
boards of directors (Zahra and Pearce, 1989). These perspectives differ 
substantially in the discussion of the mission and the duties of the boards, the 
board attributes that are considered and the criteria used to evaluate the boards' 
contribution to company performance. Below we provide a comparative and 
critical description of each perspective.
11.1. Legalistic Perspective
Advocates of the legalistic perspective claim that boards, armed with the 
power provided to them by the corporate law, influence the company 
performance by carrying out their legally mandated duties. Within this 
perspective, boards do not interfere with day-to-day operations, leaving them to 
the hands of the CEO and senior executives.
Boards' responsibilities include
• representation of shareholders' interests
• election and replacement of the CEO
• counseling top management
• monitoring managerial and company performance
The legalistic view emphasizes four board attributes: composition,
characteristics, structure and process.
Composition includes
• board size (the number of board members),
• number and relative proportions of outsiders and insiders (where an 
outsider is defined as a member who is not affiliated with the 
company except through his/her board membership),
• minority representation (which stands for the representation of 
females and ethnic minorities on the board).
Characteristics encompasses
• directors' background (age, values, technical expertise, management 
experience, ability to provide special economic services (through 
affiliation with suppliers, buyers, creditors, govenunent etc.), level 
of economic sophistication (involvement in career related and/or 
other organizations, publications), image (frequency of appearing in 
media, volunteer duties undertaken), etc.,
• board personality (independence, level of interest shown to 
organizations' activities, stock ownership, eagerness to represent 
shareholders' interests, ethical conduct, etc.).
Structure refers to
board organization, and committees (variety, purpose, time 
dimension (permanent vs. temporary), composition, election and 
task assignment procedures, flow of information, etc.), 
leadership (unitary vs. dual, where unitary refers to the case where 
the CEO is also the chairman of the board).
Process consists of
• board meetings (purpose, frequency, duration, atmosphere, 
program, level of formality, etc.),
• CEO-board interface (level of participation, avoidance, 
competition, collaboration, compromise, etc.),
• evaluation (the extend to which the board is interested in self- 
evaluation.
In the legalistic view, composition, characteristics, structure and process 
attributes determine the accomplishment of the level of service and control roles. 
The service role consists of interacting with the firm's external environment, 
improving company reputation and counseling the top management. The control 
role, on the other hand, relates to the monitoring and evaluation of the company 
and CEO performance, with the idea of protection of the shareholders' rights in 
mind.
The legalistic perspective points out to two internal contingencies as additional 
determinants of the performance of the two roles described above:
• ownership concentration: When the company stock is held by fewer 
owners, these owners (or their representatives) on the board will be more 
actively involved in seeuring the company's viability and effectiveness in 
order to maximize their wealth.
• firm size: Small firms are likely to require less board control compared to 
the larger ones where complexity of operations increase the need for better 
organization and co-ordination.
The legalistic perspective includes financial, systemic and social dimensions of 
company performance. Here, financial ^ exiorrmnce is evaluated on the basis of 
accounting and market-based criteria. Systemic performance relates to the firm's 
survival and growth and the social performance dwells on the firm's responses to 
the ever-changing expectations of the society.
Since the legalistic perspective claims that the boards should not be actively 
involved in strategy formulation, boards' influence on the company performance 
is expected to occur in an indirect way. In the aforementioned interaction, board 
attributes shape company performance via the service and control roles.
11.2. Resource Dependence Perspective
The resource dependence perspective defines the basic duty of the board as 
enabling access to resources by using prestige and personal contacts. Utilizing 
these contacts, boards provide senior executives with accurate information on a 
timely basis. Interlocking, that occurs when a person serves on more than one 
boards at the same time, has been a special concern of the research based on the 
resource dependence perspective. An interlocking director can use his/her 
membership in other boards as a means to gather crucial information, establish 
profitable business contacts and tie up important resources for the company.
The resource dependence view considers two board attributes: Composition 
and characteristics, However, it adds strategy role of the board to the service 
and control roles described before. Accordingly, this view supports the active 
involvement of the board in strategy formulation through the conduct of in-depth 
analysis and suggestion of alternatives. Note that the inclusion of the strategy 
role brings more variety and activity into board duties defined by the legalistic 
view. The company performance is measured using the financial, systemic and 
social dimens ions.
The following contingencies are listed:
• nature of the external environment.· Establishment of strong and 
sustainable links with the environment becomes especially crucial 
when a hostile and volatile environment is encountered.
• phase of the company life cycle: Research has supported that 
boards emphasize different roles at various points of the life cycle.
• type of the firm: Boards of for-profit firms tend to be less active 
since they are held legally liable for their decisions.
11.3. Class Hegemony Perspective
The class hegemony perspective, rooted in Marxist sociology, views the boards 
as means of domination of the ruling capitalist elite. Accordingly, only the most 
prestigious people are asked to serve on the boards. The remaining parties are 
deliberately eliminated so that the values and the interest of the ruling capitalists 
are protected.
This view, which is backed up by limited empirical evidence, considers 
composition, characteristics and process as the board attributes and emphasizes
service and control roles. Only the financial and systemic dimensions of the 
company performance are taken into consideration.
The contingencies listed are:
• ownership concentration (discussed before)
• CEO style (board input is valuable only when it is compatible with 
CEO's goals and preferences.)
• ruling capitalist values
//.4. Agency Theory Perspective
Agency theory revolves around the relationship between the agents 
(executives) and the principals (owners). The executives who have significant 
power and independence can act along the ways that lead to the achievement of 
their own objectives, which may be in contradiction with the shareholders' 
interest. Hence, the board should act as a control mechanism to protect the 
principals' interests.
All four board attributes {composition, characteristics, structure and process) 
are considered with more emphasis given to board decision making process, 
compared to the legalistic perspective. Agency theory takes control, service and 
strategy roles into account with special focus on the control role. Performance is 
evaluated using financial {vaarket based measures) and systemic cr'xterldi.
Two contingencies are:
• ownership concentration
• external environment
both of which have been discussed below. Advocators of the agency theory 
emphasize the direct link between board roles and company performance.
AN INTEGRATIVE MODEL
Zahra and Pearce (1989) have combined the four perspectives discussed above 
to come up with an integrative three dimensional model (See Figure 1). This 
new model encompasses all four board attributes {composition, characteristics, 
structure and process), three board roles {service, strategy and control) and all 
three dimensions of performance {financial, systemic 2Lnd social). Contingencies
are classified as external and internal, based on their dependence on the 
environmental and firm related factors, respectively.
Note that not only the direct and indirect (via roles) links between attributes 
and company performance are realized, but also the interactions among the 
board attributes themselves are brought into consideration. By indicating that 
the board attributes are shaped in accordance with the internal and external 
contingencies, the model introduces a multidimensional approach. These 
contingencies, by influencing the mix of board attributes, affect the performance 
of the board roles and hence the company performance.
The model also suggests a step-wise interaction among the board attributes. 
Board composition affects board characteristics which influence board stnicture 
and board stnicture influences board process and decision making. If there are 
too many insiders on the board, for instance, the board is likely to act passive 
and more dependent on the CEO. Unitary leadership is likely to be observed 
and the board meetings tend to turn into perfunctory gatherings which 
accomplish no more than nibber-stamping CEO's proposals.
Below, we will review the scope and findings of related research using this 
integrative framework.
INTERNAL
CONTINGENCIES
Figure 1. An Integrative Model.
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III.1. Influence of External and Internal Contingencies
III.l.l. External Contingencies
Environmental Trends·. Advocates of the agency theory define the primary role 
of the board as controlling the company executives' activities to protect the 
shareholders' interests. In this respect, the theory draws attention to the effect of 
the external environment on the relationship between owners (principals) and 
executives (agents).
Recently, a significant increase in the number of hostile take-overs has been 
realized in US. This intimidating trend made most management more interested 
in short-term returns. This short-term orientation, in turn, caused most company 
management to accept to pay greenmail, implement golden parachutes and issue 
poison pills.
A company's private repurchase of a block of its stock from a shareholder by 
paying a premium above the market price is called greenmail. It is a defensive 
measure taken to fence off the raiders, especially when there is an explicit or 
rumoured threat that a substantial stockholder plans to challenge the company 
management in a take-over.
From the agency theory perspective, greenmail decision contradicts with the 
shareholders' interests. Firstly, by giving a premium to the substantial stock 
owner, the management discriminates against the smaller stockholders and the 
corporate mission to protect all shareholders' interests is severely damaged. 
Secondly, paying greenmail enables the company management to cleverly 
eliminate the minority shareholders, who constitute a potential threat to 
management's control of the company. Thirdly, when the greenmail payment is 
financed through debt, wealth is transferred away from the small shareholders 
(Kosnik, 1987).
Golden parachutes, on the other hand, are a perquisite that enables the top 
management to voluntarily resign with significant remuneration after a 
triggering event, such as a hostile take-over. Opponents of golden parachutes 
perceive them as indicators of top management interest to maximize its own 
utility, rather than the shareholders' wealth. Some critics even claim that there is 
not much ethical difference between golden parachutes and theft. Conversely, 
others view golden parachutes as a means to attract and keep managerial talent
and to maintain the objectivity and loyalty of the top management team, 
especially when a hostile environment exists (Cochran, et al., 1985).
Poison pills are extra stock issued by the company management to thwart a 
hostile take-over attempt. The resulting effect on the shareholders' wealth 
originates from a probable decline in the stock price.
The above changes in the market have been coupled with non-negligible 
differences in the profile of the stock owners. From 1970 to 1987, the 
percentage of all corporate stock in US that is held by institutions have risen up 
to 30% from a moderate 17.5% (Power, 1987). The implications are significant 
as the institutional investors can not simply sell their stock and quit when they 
are unsatisfied with the performance of the company. An attempt to unload their 
shares will, with no doubt, push down the stock price. With such stakes in the 
industry, the institutional investors choose to stay and voice their dissatisfaction 
with the company management.
Not all institutional investors have long term horizon, however. In fact, they 
make about 70% of all stock trades in Wall Street (Nussbaum, 1987). Most of 
these transactions are realized by mutual fund managers and investment advisers 
who replace about 60-65% of their portfolios every year. Company executives 
blame these institutional investors for forcing them to focus on short term 
earnings in order to keep the stock prices up. Interestingly enough, the same 
CEOs often compel their money managers (who are in charge of the companies' 
pension funds) to outperform the market index. A vicious circle forms in which 
those who get hurt from short term orientation contribute to its sustenance.
Increased shareholder awareness and activism have enabled the shareholders to 
voice their opinion and demand to be consulted before strategic decisions that 
will have a major impact on their wealth are made. Recently, the number of law 
suits filed against the directors have increased rapidly, forcing the boards to be 
more conscientious about the performance of their control role (Sahlman, 1990).
Legal Requirements·. New legal measures have been activated in US to ensure 
the existence of a certain proportion of outsiders on the boards to facilitate the 
protection of the shareholders' interest. This interaction is a contemporary 
example for the influence of an external contingency on the board composition.
Social trends like consciousness for environmental protection, movements to 
defend consumer rights, increased sensitivity toward job security and working 
conditions also force directors to be more involved in the pursuit of their service 
role. As a safeguard against increased public concern for race and sex
discrimination, boards may include female members and/or minority 
representatives in order to signal belief in equality and human rights.
IIL1.2. Internal Contingencies
Stock Concentration: Research conducted by Hill and Snell analyzes how 
stockholder and management interests conflict in research intensive industries 
(Hill & Snell, 1988). From agency theory point of view, top management is 
perceived as an agent interested in the maximization of its own utility, where the 
utility function consists of power, security, status, wealth, etc. Accordingly, 
management is after diversification in order to decrease its employment risk. 
When too worried about short-term performance, top management is very likely 
to try to engage in extensive and unrelated diversification. Stockholders, on the 
other hand, back up innovation strategies for the maximization of their long run 
profits.
The results indicate that as the stock concentration increases, i.e., stock is 
collected in fewer hands, research and development (R&D) expenditures (chosen 
as indicator for level of innovation) increases (Hill & Snell, 1988). Hence, 
higher stock concentration enables the board to exert more control over the top 
management in order to ensure protection of shareholders' long term 
profitability.
Three years later, another research on the influence of stock ownership on 
corporate R&D strategy has been published (Baysinger et al., 1991). This time 
three measures for stock concentration are used. The first one is an overall 
measure, the second one emphasizes stock holders with larger holdings and the 
third one includes separate indicators for individual and institutional investors.
The results show that different indicators can lead to different results. A 
positive relationship is found between the overall indicator and the level of R&D 
spending, whereas no statistically significant relationship is observed between 
the second indicator and the dependent variable. As for the third measure, a 
positive relationship is observed for the case of institutional investors only. This 
result can be attributed to the possible long term commitment of the institutional 
investors. Individual investors, on the other hand, have more difficulty to 
diversify the risk and hence are more likely to opt for lower risk strategies, rather 
than giving support for R&D expenditures.
Company Sizer. The legalistic approach emphasizes the firm size as a major 
internal contingency. As we have noted before, in small firms, the board's
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service role comes to the foreground and the control role becomes underutilized. 
In larger firms, due to the increased complexity of the operations, boards tend to 
act as major control mechanisms.
Company size also affects board composition. Larger firms tend to have larger 
boards. Besides, owing to the need to co-ordinate considerable variety and 
complexity, larger companies tend to have high proportion of board members 
with above average level of technical and managerial expertise.
Small firms attract the greedy market raiders, whereas the probability of a 
hostile take-over decreases for larger firms. Accordingly, it has been shown that 
there exists a significant negative relationship between the firm size and the 
incidence of golden parachutes (Cochran, et al., 1985).
Corporate Resource Situation: Corporate resource situation of a firm can play a 
major role on board composition since it may affect the decisions of the 
candidate board members who have been invited to serve on the board. It has 
also been shown that the proportion of debt financing and the acceptance of 
golden parachutes are negatively related (Cochran, et al., 1985). This 
relationship can be attributed to the reluctance of the market raiders to attack the 
companies that are heavily financed by debt.
CEO Styl&. CEO style is a major factor that influences board attributes and 
involvement. A dominant CEO who wants to thwart board involvement, can act 
to nominate and select amiable insiders for the board so as to have full control 
over the board's decisions. Such a CEO can prevent free flow of information to 
the board, leaving the directors without any means to conduct analysis to check 
and/or evaluate top management proposals and decisions.
Pearce & Shaker (1991) drive four different typologies for the boards, taking 
different combinations of the CEO and board power:
Statutory boards
are characterized by high CEO power as opposed to low board 
power,
are dominated by CEO,
lack thorough examination of top management proposals, 
are stricken by lack of information and expertise, 
can not go beyond rubber-stamping CEO decisions.
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Caretaker boards
are characterized by low CEO and board power, 
lack corporate leadership, 
exist only as a legal necessity,
are dominated by company executives and include very few 
outsiders,
have informal and superficial proceedings and ceremonial 
decision making processes with the sole purpose of approval of 
CEO' suggestions.
Partieipative boards
•  are characterized by high CEO and board power,
•  enable extensive discussion, debate and disagreement,
•  resolve conflicts through voting; a majority role prevailing,
•  consist of large number of outsiders.
Proactive boards
are characterized by low CEO power and high board power,
act as true instruments of corporate governance,
employ many outsiders to enhance board expertise,
independence, objectivity and the representation of significant
constituents of the society,
divide board responsibilitie*· among committees,
meet frequently to facilitau dmely dissemination of information
and healthy decision making.
III.2. Direct and Indirect Influence of Board Attributes on Company 
Performance
Board attributes can have a direct effect on company performance. Similarly, 
they can determine the performance of the boards' service, control and strategy 
roles and hence influence the company performance in an indirect way. Below, 
we will concentrate on each board attribute and discuss its impact on the 
performance measures. Findings of related research will also be provided 
together with possible interpretations of the results.
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III.2.1. Effects of Board Composition on Company Performance
Indirect Effects: Recall that board composition refers to the board size, the 
number and proportion of outsiders, representation of females and ethnic 
minorities. The existence of outsider majority enables the establishment of more 
viable links with the environment. The outside members tend to use their 
affiliations with crucial private/public institutions and their personal contacts to 
secure resources for the organization. For non-profit organizations, such 
linkages can also be exploited for fund raising purposes. Hence, there seems to 
be a positive relationship between the proportion of outsiders and the 
performance of the board's service role.
Links between the board size and the performance of the control role have 
attracted much attention. Larger boards tend to resist managerial domination 
and be more actively involved in monitoring and evaluating both CEO and 
company performance. However, research results have shown that when the 
board size exceeds a threshold level, due to the cluttering effect, board 
proceedings and discussions become less effective (Patton & Baker, 1987). 
Board meetings turn into slide shows or theatricals delicately outlined by the 
chairman. Deliberately increasing the board size, is perceived as a cunning CEO 
tactic that aims to decrease the individual influence of board members (Johnson, 
1990).
A study that focuses on the impact of relative proportions of outsiders and 
insiders on the board's giving its approval to a greenmail decision, reveals 
interesting relationships (Kosnik, 1987). The results of this study indicate that 
boards that reject paying greenmail have high proportion of outsiders and/or 
higher proportion of outsiders with executive experience. Similarly, boards that 
successfully resist greenmail decisions have low proportion of insiders who are 
members of the executives' families.
Agency theory defines the board as a major control mechanism. In the above 
case, the board's pursuit of its control role (by rejecting to pay greenmail at the 
stockholders' expense) is contingent upon the board composition. The presence 
of higher proportion of outsiders enables the achievement of board's objectivity 
and independence and results in the fulfilment of the control role. Note that this 
interaction between the board composition and the control role takes place via 
board characteristics. This results from the implicit assumption that infers that 
more independence is brought into board personality by the outsiders.
Another study that examines the relationship between the proportion of 
insiders and the implementation of golden parachutes, provides counter intuitive 
results (Cochran, et al., 1985). This study computes the proportion of insiders 
by using three distinct definitions of an insider. The first proportion, INSIDER 
1, includes all members of the board who are also employees of the company. 
The second proportion, INSIDER 2, encompasses everyone in INSIDER 1 
together with all directors who have worked in the firm at some time in the past. 
The third proportion, INSIDER 3, is a much broader one that not only includes 
everyone in INSIDER 2, but also all other board members who are employees of 
the firm's suppliers, buyers, creditors and/or work in parent or subsidiary 
companies.
The results show that no matter which definition is used, a significantly 
negative relation is observed between the proportion of insiders and the 
implementation of golden parachutes. The findings are in contradiction with the 
agency theory that assumes that top management is interested in the pursuit of its 
own interest in the first place.
The findings of the study suggest that further research should be conducted to 
reveal the relationship between the insider proportion and the consumption of 
other managerial perquisites to see whether the same pattern unfolds. The 
controversial results may also indicate the need to incorporate other variable into 
the analysis to highlight the real nature of the interactions. More specifically, 
the relationship between the proportion of insiders and the activation of 
managerial perquisites is likely to be dominated by other factors such as board 
personality, CEO style and external contingencies. Using one dimensional 
frameworks that considers variables in pairs, can lead to misleading inferences.
The relationship between relative proportions of insiders and outsiders and the 
board's control strategy is also analyzed (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990). The 
authors claim that the presence of insiders on the board enables the activation of 
effective internal controls, which prevent the managers from being penalized for 
the negative outcomes over which they have had no control. Since insiders, in 
general, are more informed about the day-to-day operations, they tend to employ 
strategic control, which focuses on the strategic desirability of the decision taken 
by the top management and the flow of the events that follow the 
implementation. The system of strategic control, obviously, requires more 
information input and engagement in a more diligent evaluation of managerial 
performance. The system of financial control, on the other hand, focuses on the 
outcome only. Outsiders, in the pursuit of their control role to protect
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shareholders' interests, may keep top management responsible for undesirable 
outcomes even when an unexpected external impact has caused the failure.
The authors claim that the financial controls correlate managerial performance 
with short term variations in the market value of the firm and hence cause 
managers to focus on the short term profits. Adoption of a short term horizon 
decreases the incentives to take risks and the effort is transferred away from high 
risk- high return strategies that are favored by the stockholders.
The analysis contributes to our understanding of the board's control role in the 
corporate world by drawing upon board's responsibilities to the top management 
in addition to its duties to protect shareholders' interests. Nevertheless, insider 
domination may support CEO opportunism in spite of the severity of the 
liabilities awaiting.
Larger boards with more outsiders and minority representatives tend to enable 
appropriate circumstances for free debate and discussion of company mission, 
goals and strategies. Also the proportion of outsiders is shown to be positively 
related to the likelihood of board involvement in strategic restructuring 
(Johnson, et al., 1993). This result conforms with the common personification 
of the outsiders as the guardians of shareholders' wealth. Being more objective 
and independent, outsiders are expected to stand for shareholders' rights.
Congruent results are obtained from a research that focuses on the changes in 
hospital services during a fixed time period (Goodstein & Boeker, 1991). The 
hospital sector is chosen as a representative of industries that are characterized 
by significant turbulence and increased competition. The number of service 
additions and divestitures are taken as the measures of strategic change.
The results indicate that increases in the proportion of outsiders and the 
increase in the number of service additions are positively associated. However, 
no significant relation is found between the proportion of outsiders and the 
number of service divestitures. Considering the intensity of the competition 
among the hospitals and the rivals interest in providing new services, one can 
infer that most strategic change is likely to be reflected in the service additions, 
rather than service divestitures which are most likely to raise too much 
resistance.
Direct Effects'. Literature surveys reveal contradictory results on the direct 
effect of board size on company performance. Some associate small board size 
with higher rate of bankruptcy, whereas others claim that large boards inhibit
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effective performance (Chaganti et al., 1985; Provan, 1980; Zahra & Stanton, 
1988).
We may hypothesize that an inverted U shape relationship exists between 
board size and company performance. Up to a threshold level, performance 
increases with board size under the influence of the diminishing returns 
principle. Beyond the threshold level, cluttering gets in the way and 
performance starts declining with the inclusion of each additional member.
Research conducted in research intensive industries indicates a negative 
relation between the proportion of the insiders and the financial performance 
measured by return on assets (ROA) (Hill & Snell, 1988). Other studies report 
that no relationship is observed between the proportion of outsiders and the 
firm's financial performance (Chaganti, et al., 1985; Zahra & Stanton, 1988). 
Contradictory results can be attributed to inconsistencies in variable definitions 
and the lack of validity check for some underlying assumptions.
There is apparent lack of uniformity in the definition of an insider and an 
outsider, for instance. In addition, some studies are based on the absolute 
number of outsiders, others use proportions and some others utilizes both 
measures. Some studies claim that a high proportion of outsiders is not 
sufficient to guarantee outsider effectiveness, hence they suggest a new measure 
for outsider dominance.
No significant relationship between female and minority representation and 
corporate performance is found (Zahra & Stanton, 1988). This result can be 
attributed to the limited presence of both groups on the boards.
III.2.2. Effects of Board Characteristics on Company Performance
Indirect Effects·. Recall that board characteristics are made up of two 
components: Directors' background and board personality. The higher is the 
proportion of board members with high economic sophistication, credible public 
image and strong affiliation with institutions cnicial to the firm, the more is the 
service role legitimized.
In this framework, interlocking directorates act as vehicles for inter 
organizational co-ordination or control. With such a significant impact, 
interlocks constitute a major research topic, especially for advocators of the 
resource dependence perspective. Nevertheless, it is pointed out that research on 
the identification of interlocks between competitive firms in the same industry
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has overestimated the number of interloeks and hence overemphasized their 
influence on inter organizational linkages (Zajac, 1988).
Zajac claims that past research has either double counted the linkages between 
the firms or used broad categories in grouping firms. He shows that, after 
regrouping and proper counting, one can not find a significant difference 
between the links among a group of competing firms and those among randomly 
selected ones. As a concluding remark, Zajac also suggests that individuals do 
not always accept multiple board membership in order to arrange the firm's 
interaction with its environment; personal reasons like economic incentives, 
desire for prestige and career objectives can constitute the underlying motives.
Stock concentration of directors has frequently been taken into account as a 
determinant of the board's performance of its control and strategy roles. 
Directors' interests are expected to be more aligned with those of shareholders if 
they hold considerable stakes in the firm. The directors are predicted to get more 
motivated to monitor the CEO and company performance and be more involved 
in formulating strategies that will enable maximization of the long run profits.
Supporting evidence comes from a study that reports that increased board 
involvement is positively associated with the board's equity holdings (Johson, et 
al 1993). Conversely, a significant positive relationship is observed between 
outsiders' equity holdings and '-e boards' giving its approval to a greenmail 
proposal (Kosnik, 1987). The author explains this counterintuitive result by 
pointing out that director equity holdings are much smaller than those of 
managers. Such small proportions, most probably, fall short of motivating the 
directors to be deeply involved in steering the company into the future.
Direct Effects'. Vance(1968) attempts to determine measurable traits of the 
board members and use them to analyze the functionality of the board. He 
concentrates on technical expertise, management experience, special economic 
services, broad economic sophistication, image, asset impact, interlocking and 
owners’ equity to describe board characteristics.
Vance rates each board member on the basis of these eight criteria and sums up 
individual points in order to evaluate the board as a whole. From another 
perspective, he analyzes individual ratings of the board members to observe 
whether uniformity exists. Boards are expected' to be dominated by the 
influence of a minority if a minority group (or a particular member) with 
significantly high ratings exist(s). If all the individual ratings fall within an 
acceptable range, the board personality is expected to be more democratic.
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An application of the Vance model for six real life organizations is provided in 
Mirze (1989). The main flaw of the model stems from the difficulty in rating the 
board members. The ratings are severely limited by the knowledge, common 
sense and subjective beliefs of the rater. Besides, the model is of utmost value 
only when it is used to compare two or more boards or analyze the changes in a 
board’s characteristics over time. When the comparison is among different 
boards, it is hard to find a rater with sufficient knowledge on each of the boards 
examined. Raters’ bias may get in the way when different raters are used for 
each board.
Another research conducted by Vance (1978) on 40 large manufacturing 
corporations indicates that performance (measured by total return to investors, 
changes in Fortune rankings and return on stockholders’ capital) is positively 
associated with the degree of insider representation and negatively related to 
external expertise and increased focus on interest groups.
Drawing on the fact that board members have to deal with internal concerns as 
well as external contingencies, Pearce (1983) aims to replace the traditional 
insider/outsider classification with a new one based on the board’s inclination to 
undertake internal and external duties. His results indicate a strong association 
between board’s internal orientation and the firm’s financial performance.
III.2.3. Effects of Board Structure on Company Performance
Indirect Effects·. Establishment of board committees has become a common 
practice in recent years. Committees not only enable healthy distribution of the 
workload, but also give way to specialization. Due to the variety and complexity 
of board duties and responsibilities, boards can easily turn into ineffective and 
inefficient management units if decentralization and authority delegation can not 
be carried out.
Committees enable better utilization of human resources when strong 
association is established between the purpose of each committee and the 
expertise of its participants. Through division of the workload, especially 
outside members gain more time to conduct in-depth analysis about certain 
issues. Involvement and individual contribution are expected to increase.
Committees differ in purpose (nominating, auditing, etc.), durability 
(temporary vs. permanent), nature (counseling vs. execution) and composition. 
Their effectiveness and efficiency depend heavily on each of these factors and 
the interactions among them. Board committees can turn into expensive time­
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killing mechanisms, if committee composition can not lead to synergy. Also 
when committee members confine their board membership responsibilities with 
the committee assignments, board integration becomes seriously at stake.
Kesner (1988) points out that in spite of the fact that most board decisions are 
made at the committee level, researchers keep concentrating on the overall 
composition and characteristics of the boards. Accordingly, she attempts to 
conduct a study on the composition and the characteristics of the board 
committees.
Kesner’s findings reveal that there are disproportionately more outsiders than 
insiders on major board committees (auditing, nominating, compensation, 
executive). This can be attributed to the interference of the US regulatory 
agencies, which have brought obligations to increase the number of outsiders on 
the boards. The results also show that board committees include 
disproportionately more business executives than individuals with nonbusiness 
occupation. Such a result is expected since expertise is sought in committee 
member nomination. The findings also reveal that board committees consist of 
disproportionately more directors with long tenure than directors with short 
tenure. This suggests that directors with long tenure are assumed to possess a 
deeper understanding of the firm and its operations and are asked to channel this 
accumulation to the committee proceedings.
Fulfilment of the directors’ information requirements is a major prerequisite 
for the pursuit of the board roles. Especially, outside members need to be well- 
informed about company’s operations and be equipped with necessary means 
that will enable them to conduct their own analysis to check on the top 
management’s proposals. Boards in deprive of accurate and timely information 
about the issues of concern, can go no further than rubber-stamping CEO 
proposals.
Board members should be provided with in-depth information about the 
following issues: (Bacon & Brown, 1975)
•  capabilities and the influence of the top management,
•  mission, goals, objectives and strategic management of the company,
•  equity structure, liquidity, cash flows,
•  organizational strengths and weaknesses,
•  policies regarding to the interaction between the company and its legal/social 
environment,
•  social responsibilities of the company.
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Research has identified five different methods that can be used to meet the 
information requirements of the board of directors (Rockart, 1979):
•  By-Product Technique: Directors/managers are provided with a report
prepared by dumping all data in the company’s operational database. The 
data pertain to inventory, sales (cash or credit), payments account 
receivable and wages, etc.
•  Null Approach: Directors are informed verbally by trustworthy expert 
counselors.
•  Key Indicator System: Initially key indicators that reflect the overall
company performance are selected. The realized value of each key 
indicator is compared with its expected value and directors/managers are 
only informed about the key indicators that show discrepancies.
• Total Study Process: Directors/managers are questioned about their
information requirements. Their input is then used to modify the existing 
information system.
•  Critical Success Factor: The information requirements of
directors/managers are determined by taking the critical success factors 
into account. Critical success factors are defined in such a way that the 
firm’s high performance in each of there activities can lead to overall 
performance improvement. Since such activities are so crucial for firm’s 
survival and success, managers/directors are continuously provided with 
related information.
Direct Effects'. Research has focused on the effects of board leadership (unitary 
vs. dual) on company performance. Recall that dual leadership occurs when the 
CEO serves as the Chairman of the Board as well. Intuition suggests a positive 
association between dual leadership and better performance since effective 
checks and balances are in place.
Unitary leadership is shown to have a negative effect only on one of the four 
performance measures taken into account (Berg & Smith, 1978). Chaganti et al. 
(1985) reports that no association is found between board leadership and the 
occurrence of bankruptcy, which is used as a specific measure for performance.
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III. 2.4. Effects of Board Process on Company Performance
Indirect Effects'. Boards hold periodic meetings to discuss and decide on 
various issues pertaining to the company and CEO performance. The frequency, 
duration, purpose, content and the general atmosphere of these meetings 
determine the level of board contribution.
Board meetings can be classified into four groups based on their purpose : 
(Jay, 1976)
•  Information Meetings: aim to provide directors with information on the 
company activities.
•  Decision Meetings; aim to decide “what to do”.
•  Orientation Meetings: aim to answer “how to do” type of questions.
•  Procedural Meetings: aim to discuss changes in organizational and
operational policies and procedures.
In order that board meetings will not turn into unorganized assortments of 
arbitrary discussions, board members should be well-informed about the content 
and the purpose of each meeting in advance. Such practice will enable directors 
to attend the meetings well prepared and facilitate individual contribution.
Direct Effects. The number of empirical studies concerning board processes is 
limited. This may stem from the difficulty in accessing the boards frequently 
enough to enable full description of the ways the board meetings are conducted. 
Previous analysis suggests that the influence of board processes on company 
performance occurs via board roles most of the time. Hence, shifting the focus 
on the indirect effects is suggested (Zahra & Pearce, 1989).
IV. ANALYSIS OF TURKISH BOARDS: EMPIRICAL 
RESEARCH
At the initial phase of an empirical study that has been designed to prepare the 
groundwork and guidelines for an extensive study on the typology of the Turkish 
board of directors, though informed about the composition and the functioning 
of the US boards, we felt somewhat clueless about those of the Turkish boards. 
Related previous research remained limited in both scope and dimension, since it 
has either focused on the legally mandated duties of the boards only, or remained
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confined with the analysis and evaluation of a few corporate boards (Doganay, 
1994; Mirze, 1989). Under these circumstances, we started out with the purpose 
of concluding the introductory stage of a more comprehensive future researeh on 
the composition and the funetioning of the Turkish boards.
Although one could access to the annual reports to obtain some data 
concerning the composition of the boards of those companies that have gone 
public, in order to collect data about the characteristies, structure, and processing 
of the boards, we had to communicate with the board members themselves.
We chose to prepare open-ended questions and arrange face to face interviews 
with the board members in order to facilitate the degree of mutual 
communication, and enable the aecumulation of valuable knowledge. It was not 
difficult to come up with an original list of open-ended questions: The literature 
survey we have conducted has provided the guidelines, together with the 
attributes and roles specified in the integrative model (explained above).
We strongly believed in the advantages of face to face interviews in such 
circumstances. Not only would such interactions enable us to test the 
significance and validity of our questions for the Turkish boards, but would also 
help us uncover special practices pertaining to the constitution and functioning 
of the Turkish boards. The accumulated knowledge would, in turn, enable the 
modification of the list of questions which could then be used in other interviews 
or questionnaires for more extensive research.
Below, we provide a comprehensive list of the open-ended questions we have 
started with. The questions are subgrouped based on the variables of the 
integrative model, just to facilitate organization and flow.
IV. 1. Interview Questions
External Contingencies:
• Has any legal sanctions altered the composition of the boards?
• How do you compare the overall level of board involvement in this 
industry with that of others? Do you believe that board involvement is 
associated with the nature of the industry in which the firm operates in? If 
so, how does this association work?
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Internal Contingencies:
Who are the shareholders?
What are the proportions of institutional or individual investors?
How do the approaches (short term vs. long term orientation) and attitudes 
(demanding to voice its opinion vs. ignorant) of these shareholders differ? 
How has the equity structure of the company changed over the years?
Do you recall any occasion where the shareholders’ claim for the 
protection of their rights has lead to an increased involvement of the board? 
Do you believe that CEOs favor strong boards? Why/why not ?
How do you think the CEO style and attitude affect board effectiveness? 
Do you recall an instance which can exemplify this interaction?
How do you evaluate the managerial experience and technical knowledge 
of the top management team? How does it affect board composition and 
involvement?
Do you believe that increased stock concentration triggers the top 
management to be more interested in the long run profitability of the firm? 
Do you believe that increased stock concentration triggers the directors to 
be more interested in the long run profitability of the firm?
Composition & Characteristics:
About the board size:
• Has the size of the board changed in the recent years? If yes, what were 
the reasons that caused the increase/decrease in size?
• How do you think the size of your company’s board is related to its 
effectiveness?
About the insiders & outsiders:
• How has the insider/outsider ratio changed over the years? What were the 
influencing factors?
• Who are the insiders on your board? How are they elected?
• Who are the outsiders on your board, if any ? How are they elected?
For companies whose boards constitute of insiders only:
• Why do you think the board has no outsider members?
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• How do you personally evaluate the contribution of the outsiders? Do 
you think they can bring in fresh blood if they are asked to serve on the 
board?
For companies whose boards constitute of both insiders and outsiders:
• How do you compare the independence of the insiders with that of 
outsiders?
• How do you compare the contribution of the insiders with that of the 
outsiders?
• How is the interaction between insiders and outsiders?
• How eager are the insiders to transfer operational information 
to the outsiders?
• Do insiders believe in or try to block the outsider contribution 
and effectiveness?
• Are insiders open to debate and criticisms?
• How much power do the insiders have on the nomination and 
election of the outsiders?
• Do special personal affiliations exist among the insiders and 
the outsiders? If so, do you think such affiliations hinder the 
level of independence and the objectivity of the outsiders?
• Do the members of your board hold multiple board membership? If so, 
how do you think, it affects the efficiency and contribution of the 
directors?
• Do you think the information requirements of the outsiders are 
thoroughly fulfilled?
• Are the outsiders, most of the time, contended with the information 
supplied to them or do they actively seek more ?
• Are the outsiders eager to learn about the company activities?
• How do you evaluate the outsiders’ contribution to management 
control?
About general characteristics:
• How do you evaluate the eagerness of your board members to involve in
strategy formulation and implementation?
• How do you evaluate the overall competence of your board members in
familiarity with company operations?
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• How do you evaluate the outside linkages and personal contacts of your 
board members? How do you think, they contribute to the profitability or 
credibility of the company?
The answers to these questions are expected to shed light on the past and 
present compositions of the Turkish boards, profiles of outsiders and insiders, 
the extend to which outside members are used, the nature of the interaction 
among the insiders and the outsiders, and the performance and contributions of 
insiders and outsiders.
Past research on the association between the number and proportion of 
outsiders and the company performance has reported contradictory results. As 
pointed out before, these studies have remained one-dimensional most of the 
time and have ignored other aspects of the big picture. The above analysis is 
expected to provide us with a more realistic and multidimensional perspective 
that will facilitate our understanding of the interactions among the variables.
Structure:
• Which type of leadership (unitary vs. dual) applies to your company? 
What are the pros and cons?
• How do you evaluate the existing information system?
• Are the procedures formal/informal?
• How are the board members informed about the company activities ?
• Is the information content, frequency and quality satisfactory?
• Is this information flow sufficient to enable directors sufficient means 
in monitoring and evaluating the top management proposals?
For companies with already established committees:
• How has the number and the types of the board committees changed over 
the years? What factors influenced such changes?
• What is the current situation?
• How many committees are there?
• What are their functions and missions?
• Are they temporary or permanent?
• How do you define their responsibility/authority balance?
• What is the procedure followed in forming a new committee? How is the 
need assessed? How does the nomination and election mechanisms work ?
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• How does the board composition differ from committee composition ?
• How do you evaluate the contribution of the committees to the board 
effectiveness?
• Do you believe that the directors’ experience and knowledge can best be 
utilized through committees? Why/why not ?
• How do you evaluate the flow of information and the level of co-ordination 
among the existing committees?
For companies without board committees:
• Why do you think no board committees have been established so far ?
• Do you personally feel the necessity for the establishment of board 
committees? If yes, which ones ? If no, why not ?
Process:
About the board meetings;
• How often do board meetings take place?
• How do you evaluate the participation level ?
• What is the duration ? Is working overtime a common practice?
• What are the frequencies of
• informative
• decisive
• orienting
• procedural meetings?
• What is the general environment like? (overhead projector, slides, 
handouts, verbal communication, etc.)
• How is the atmosphere? (industrious, friendly vs. hostile, debate oriented, 
aggressive, consensus vs. power driven, diligent vs. perfunctory, formal vs. 
informal, etc.)
• Are the directors informed about the program of the meeting in advance?
• Are the directors given sufficient time to examine related data and 
documents?
• Do the directors come prepared?
• Do the meetings follow a well-defined program ? Are there last minute 
additions/deletions?
• How do you describe and evaluate the decision making process?
• quick vs. slow
• informed vs. uninformed
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• impulsive vs. deliberate, etc.
• How do you describe and evaluate the board’s self evaluation mechanisms?
IV. 2. Scope, Research Sample & Methodology
The purpose of this research is to conduct a pilot study to reveal the typologies 
of the Turkish corporate boards. In order to define and describe these 
typologies, we concentrate on the board attributes (composition, characteristics, 
structure, and process), together with the board roles (service, strategy, and 
control). Our major concern is to account for the interaction among the board 
attributes and roles. The determination of the identity and impact of the internal 
and external contingencies on this interaction constitutes a supplementary issue.
Our preference is biased towards accessing as many corporations as possible 
rather than focusing on how the board practices have changed within a few 
corporations over time. Such a decision has originated from the priority attached 
to enabling the accumulation of knowledge on the current board practices. We 
believe that once the current situation is truly and thoroughly understood, the 
evolution of the corporate boards can be better evaluated.
Concentration on the current situation of the boards, however, prevents us 
from considering the performance aspect within the scope of this study. Since 
the corporate performance evolves as the outcome of the interaction among the 
contingencies, board attributes and roles over a period of time, evaluation of the 
links among the performance and the other elements can not be based upon the 
observations taken at one point in time.
For instance, the financial performance of a corporation as of today will not 
only be related to the current composition and the functioning of its board, but 
will also rely on the past board practices. Even when the financial data for a 
period is captured, the analysis can not be completed unless the changing board 
attributes and roles within the same period are also taken into account. Such 
accounts of history require conducting interviews with the past board members 
in addition to the current ones. Due to these limiting factors, we choose to defer 
the inclusion of the performance dimension to the analysis for the time being and 
concentrate on the attributes, roles and contingencies only.
With such scope defined, we attempted to access to the board members of the 
private corporations. Our emphasis was toward more institutionalized 
corporations, since we hoped to encounter more developed board practices there. 
Needless to say. the contents of our sample were seriously affected by the
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accessibility of the board members. There was absolutely no way of getting in 
contact with some of the directors, due to their busy schedules. Special 
references had to be furnished in most cases, before the interviews were 
scheduled.
The members of the sample were not defined ahead of time, neither were the 
members classified into subgroups. As we proceeded with our interviews, we 
observed that certain groupings would be beneficial. Once these subgroups 
became apparent, we started selecting the remaining members of our sample, 
taking the distribution of the members of the sample among these subgroups 
into account. When we felt that emphasizing the board practices of a certain 
subgroup would be worthwhile, we attempted to increase its size.
9 HOLDINGS
4  SMALL FIRMS 3 JO INT VENTURES
4  INDEPENDENT CASES
Figure 2. The Research Sample
Three members of our sample, though all were corporations, showed some 
very special features. Therefore, we have chosen to consider them separately 
as independent cases. We also included a foundation within our sample, in 
order to compare and contrast its board practices with those of the 
corporations. With the foundation, the number of independent cases increased 
to four.
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Figure 2 depicts how the 20 elements of our sample is distributed among the 
subgroups. From now on, in compliance with the confidentiality required by 
some of the board members we have interviewed, we will use a special code 
for each member of our sample. Each code will start with a letter (or two) 
symbolizing the subgroup of this member belong to (H for holdings, JV for 
joint ventures, IC for independent cases), followed by a sequence number. 
For instance, the first holding we will describe will be called H-1, the third 
joint venture we will talk about will be referred to as JV-3, and the second 
independent case will be designated by IC-2. Small firms are held as 
exceptions, since all four of them are examined together.
Figure 3. The Stock Ownership Structure of the Selected Holdings
Note that even within these subgroups, the members are not identical in 
many aspects. In fact special care has been shown to include corporations of 
different sizes, ages, and stock ownership structure. Table I in Appendix 
presents a short introduction to the selected holdings and outlines the core 
business areas. Figure 3 provides information about the stockownership
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structure of these holdings. Figures 4 and 5 briefly describe the selected joint 
ventures and independent cases. Detailed information pertaining to each member 
will be provided in the following section.
Figure 4. The Stock Ownership Structure of the Selected Joint Ventures.
IC-1
has 8 major, 12 minor shareholders, 
Includes 15 companies, 
lives the pre-holding phase.
IC-2
majority of the shares are 
held by a state bank.
INDEPENDENT CASES
IC-3
Is considered
within the private sector,
although the majority of the shares are
held by the state.
1C-4
Is a foundation established 
with the joint effort of 
public and private organizations 
and persons.
Figure 5. The Stock Ownership Structure & Special Features of 
the Selected Independent Cases.
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IV.2. Interviews
All interviews started with a brief introductory speech of the interviewer, 
which was designed to inform the board member about the purpose and the 
scope of the study. Most of the directors’ first reaction was to emphasize the 
significance of the topic and express pleasure upon the initiation of a related 
research. Next, the director was asked to provide general information about the 
scope of the business activities of the corporation. This step helped most 
directors to warm up and facilitated a smooth transition to the questions about 
the organization of the corporation.
The questions pertaining to the composition of the board were asked first, 
since their straightforward nature comforted the directors and enhanced the flow 
of mutual interaction. The first critical questions related to the outsiders’ 
existence on the boards. The conversation was later lead towards the discussion 
of the board characteristics.
Most directors were reluctant to talk about the board meetings, and attempted 
to use phrases like, “all meetings are arranged as stated in the Turkish Law of 
Commerce”. Most of them declined to understand that we were more interested 
about the general atmosphere of these meetings, rather than the legal restrictions 
that determined their frequency.
Although a list of questions has been prepared in advance, the specifics of the 
board and the attitude of the board member significantly influenced the direction 
of the interview. For instance »vuen the board member mentioned that the board 
consisted of insiders only, who were at the same time the major shareholders, 
and the top management did not believe in the contribution of the outsiders, 
he/she automatically blocked the questions pertaining to the outsiders and the 
CEO-board interface.
Some questions were initially designed to enable comparison of the past board 
practices with the current ones. However, some of the directors interviewed 
were new members, and did not know about the past applications. Hence, the 
related questions remained unanswered.
Interestingly enough, additional questions evolved during the interviews. 
These questions were related to the common practices shared by the members of 
the same subgroup, and contributed a whole lot in uncovering the actual roles of 
the board, the Executive Committee, and the professional managers. We will talk 
more about these new questions in the coming sections.
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V. LEGAL ENVIRONMENT
In compliance with most directors’ remarks about the Turkish Commercial 
Law, we will provide paraphrazed versions of the most significant articles 
concerning the corporate boards, followed by short interpretations.
V. 1. Articles Concerning the Constitution of the Boards
Turkish Commercial Law contains the following issues concerning the 
composition and processing of the corporate boards (Eriş, 1987):
Boards of the corporations consist of a minimum of three members who must 
also be shareholders of the company. Those who are selected as directors but 
do not own company shares can start serving on the board only after they 
become shareholders (article 312).
Accordingly, corporations are free to have more than three directors on their 
boards upon re^  eiving the authorization of the shareholders through specification 
in the Articles of Association. Also a symbolic share ownership is sufficient to 
fulfill the above requirement about the stock ownership of the directors. 
Nevertheless, these shares can not be transferred or sold back until the elected 
directors are acquitted by the company shareholders.
The members of the boards f  the corporations are elected for a maximum of 
three years. Unless specified in the Articles of Association, they can be 
reelected (article 314).
In case a board membership position is vacated, the board has the authority to 
elect a new member who fulfills the legal requirements. In the following 
shareholders meeting, the board asks for the approval of the new member. 
When a board member is charged with penal servitude or sentenced due to 
forgery, breach of confidence, theft or fraud, his/her board membership is 
cancelled (article 315).
Note that if the number of vacated membership positions is too large to inhibit 
the functioning of the board with the remaining members, an extraordinary 
shareholders meeting is called for and elections are made.
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Board memberships can be ceased by the decisions made at the shareholders 
meetings. The dismissed members do not posses the right to seek compensation 
(article 316).
V.2. Articles Concerning the Management & Representation Roles 
of the Boards
Corporations are managed and represented by their board o f directors (article 
317).
Accordingly, the board of directors represents the corporation against both the 
shareholders and the third parties. Boards can be assigned with extra duties, 
other than those specified by the law, through designation in the Articles of 
Association. The boards are authorized to file lawsuits, give up claims and to 
receive any lawsuits filed against the corporation.
Each year the board elects a Chairman and a Deputy Chairman (to act in the 
absence of the former) among its members. The board is free to form as many 
board committees and commissions as needed in order to monitor the company 
activities, report on crucial matters like the allocation of the budget and to 
follow-up with the applications of the decisions taken (article 318).
The management and reprc .¡uuon roles of the board can be delegated 
among the members of the board according to the specifications in the Articles 
of Association. At least one member of the board is given the authority to 
represent the corporation (article 319).
The management and representation authority of the board can be totally or 
partially delegated to one of the board members, to a group of members 
(committees or commissions) or to a third party who is not a board member 
(CEO in some cases).
V.3. Articles Concerning the Board Meetings
Unless stated otherwise in the Articles of Association, one more than the half 
of the members should be present, at minimum, for the board to take a decision. 
Provided that this requirement is fulfilled, the decisions are based on majority 
vote. In case of a tie, the decision is deferred until the next board meeting 
(article 330).
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The commercial law does not strictly define the place, the time and the 
program of the board meetings. Corporations are supposed to design their own 
arrangements and state them in their Articles of Association.
Recall that the minimum number of members in a corporate board is three. For 
a board with three members, all directors should be present for the board to take 
a decision. In the absence of one member, the remaining two can not decide 
even though they both agree on the issue.
Board members have the right to ask the company managers to attend the 
hoard meetings in order to inform the hoard on certain issues about the 
company activities. The board of directors has the authority to demand the 
submission of the related documentation to the hoard for examination. Each 
hoard member has the right to ask the Chairman of the board (using written 
media) to assemble the board (article 331).
VI. CONTENT ANALYSIS
Content analysis is defined as “a research technique for making replicable and 
valid inferences from data due to their contexf’ (Krippendorff, 1980). The 
replicability aspect requires that when the same technique is applied to the same 
data by different researchers at different times, the results obtained will be 
identical.
A researcher conducting content analysis, places the data communicated from 
the sender within a context that he/she defines based on his/her knowledge of the 
surrounding conditions. The inferences are made by using the researcher’s 
knowledge of the stable factors of the system considered. The results (in the 
form of inferences) should represent some feature of the real system.
Content analysis includes design, execution, and reporting activities. 
However, the relationship among these activities is not necessarily temporal. 
Design updates can take place even when one is in the execution stage, just like 
our modification of the open-ended questions after we have started conducting 
the interviews. Similarly, just like our arranging additional interviews with the 
members of the subgroups that have not been sufficiently covered, the execution 
phase can be revisited even when engaged with the reporting activity.
Below we consider each member of our sample one by one, and provide a 
detailed description of the board composition, characteristics, structure and
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processing. Note that due to the reasons explained in the Interviews section, 
different characteristics may be emphasized for different subgroups. Tables in 
Appendix summarize and compare the board structure and practices among the 
members of the same subgroup.
Vt.1. Holding Companies
As we have already pointed out, new interview questions originated as we 
proceeded with our interviews with the board members. As for the holdings, we 
observed that the influence of the major shareholders on the boards was a 
primary concern. Hence, we rephrased our questions on board attributes to 
reveal the level of authority held by these shareholders and the degree of 
influence they have on the other board members.
Another point of concern was the relationship among the holding board and 
the boards of the subsidiary companies. The penetration of the major 
shareholders into the company boards and the intergroup interlockings came into 
the picture at this point.
We also realized that the Exc ;:<^ ive Committee showed up as a very powerful 
managerial organ and asked questions to understand its composition and 
functions. Lastly, upon observing different functions assigned to the 
Coordinator position, we attempted to explore the duties and responsibilities of 
the Coordinator.
The results of our interviews with the members of the holding boards lead us 
to emphasize the following issues in our evaluation:
For the holding boards:
the composition of the board, with particular emphasis on owners’ 
representation
the stock ownership structure of the board members 
the insider/outsider ratio
the level of authority provided to the outside members
the election criteria for the outsiders
the affiliation of the outsiders with the company owners
the owners’ opinion about the degree of the contribution of the outsiders
the identity of the insiders
the level of managerial and technical expertise of the board 
the degree of boards’ involvement in the company activities
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the existence and functioning of the Coordinator position
the existence, composition, and authority of the Executive Committee
the degree of authority delegated to professional managers
the level of penetration of the owners’ influence to the company boards
the degree of formality of the board meetings
For the boards of the companies within the group:
• the general managers’ board membership
• the degree of inter group interlocking
• the owners’ board membership
• the outsiders’ board membership
• the degree of formality of the board meetings
Below, we provide a detailed description of the board practices in each holding 
within the framework drawn using the points listed above.
Holding 1:
H-1 is one of the oldest and most outstanding corporations of Turkey, which 
has celebrated its 50th anniversary in 1992. The headquarters is located in 
Istanbul. The companies within the group are organized in three main divisions: 
Pharmaceuticals, Building Materials, Paper Products Divisions. The remaining 
activities pertain to investment and securities, welding electrodes, finance, 
insurance, information systems, market research and foreign trade.
H-1 top management defines the mission and the responsibilities of the holding 
as follows: “The holding is responsible for long-range plarming, financial
management, auditing and new project evaluation for the companies within the 
group. It also acts as a consultant for all the organizational work of the group. 
The holding analyzes international developments in production, technology and 
marketing, assisting the companies within the group to achieve modern 
economies of scale through new ventures or international partnerships.”
In practice, the holding board assumes a more autocratic management style and 
adopts a highly centralized organization. The holding board consists of eight 
members, four of which are members of the owner family. Three of these four 
people also act as the directors of the three major divisions listed above. The 
forth family member is the general manager of one of the companies within the 
group. The remaining four directors are outsiders and academicians.
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The outsiders have been elected on the basis of their knowledge, experience, 
background, and reputation. The owners admit that the presence of these 
outsiders contributes to the image and prestige of the holding. Nevertheless, the 
capacity of the outsiders is underutilized since they are expected to serve as 
consultants only. A more active contribution is neither encouraged nor desired.
The holding board meetings take place four or five times within a year. The 
directors evaluate the performance reached and discuss future scenarios and 
objectives. The outsiders are asked to interpret the economic indicators and 
comment on their possible influence on the business activities of the group of 
companies. The strategic decisions are taken by the owners under the light of 
the information provided.
Although the companies within the group have their own boards, formal board 
meetings are not held most of the time. The size of these boards ranges from 
four to eleven. The boards meet once a month to fulfill the requirements of the 
Commercial Law, but orders are dictated from the holding level and a tight 
coordination exists among the companies. Intergroup interlocking is very 
common.
The boards of the joint ventures are somewhat more independent. Formal 
board meetings take place where issues are discussed in full detail. The group is 
represented by carefully selected insiders at the joint venture boards. The joint 
ventures usually have Executive Committees to which the board authority is 
delegated to a certain extend.
Holding 2:
H-2 is an Istanbul based corporation engaged in a wide range of business 
activities including manufacturing (of heating and cooling equipment, and the 
machinery and equipment for the industry investments), undertaking of turn-key 
projects, construction of houses and offices, finance and tourism. 75% of the 
holding shares pertain to two major shareholders and the rest is the traded at the 
Istanbul Stock Exchange. The holding shares were first quoted in the stock 
exchange in 1987, and from then on they have been valued to 147 fold.
The holding board consists of eight members, two of which are the two major 
shareholders. The rest of the membership positions are filled out by professional 
managers, who have worked with the group for many years. The holding board 
gathers once a month due to the requirements of the Law of Commerce.
Informally, the authority and the power lie in the hands of the Executive 
Committee. The members of this committee constitute 75% of the holding
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board. More specifically, the two major shareholders and the heads of the major 
divisions are included in the Executive Committee.
The Executive Committee meets one to three times per week. The programs of 
the meetings are usually prepared ahead of time so that the members can come 
prepared. In case a delay occurs in the preparation of the program, the meeting 
is postponed. The strategic decisions are made at the committee level and 
approved at the board meetings most of the time.
The top management sincerely believes in the need for an outsider eye, that 
will use a broad perspective in evaluating the company activities. It is admitted 
that the executives are swamped with the details most of the time and may fail to 
see the big picture. However, the holding management has serious doubts about 
the possible level of involvement of an outsider. The outsider’s contribution is 
expected to be limited because of the time he/she can allocate to the corporation.
One of the two major shareholders serves on the board of another corporation 
outside the group. H-2 top management believes that the presence of this 
shareholder on the board brings i ■ ot of cidvantages to that company, since the 
vast business experience, pc sonai contacts and credible public image of this 
director can be easily capitalized on. It is also reported that H-2 would be 
willing to offer a board membership position to such a personality to make use 
of similar advantages.
The division heads in the Executive Committee are also the Chairman of the 
boards of the associated companies. Intergroup interlocking is very frequent. 
The composition of the company boards are designed in such a way that 
managers, financial analysts and technical members will all be included. 
However, due to the nature of the business activity, the directors with technical 
experience usually prevail.
The company boards are expected to prepare their own budget in conformity 
with the general framework provided by the holding management. These 
budgets are then presented to the holding board for approval.
The professional managers claim that H-2 has gone a long way towards 
institutionalization. It’s been reported that both the board and the committee 
meetings have a democratic atmosphere; personal comments are welcomed as 
long as they are supported by logical rationale, criticisms are taken at ease, and 
when validated, the proposals of the professional managers are seriously 
considered.
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Holding 3:
H-3 is an Istanbul based corporation engaged in various business activities in 
financial services, tourism and the media. The holding was established in 1992 
to establish coordination among subsidiary companies and to prepare the basis 
and the organization that will facilitate collaboration. It aims to achieve 
effective involvement in the fields of project development and project financing, 
in addition to the evaluation of the opportunities for mergers and acquisitions
1 he holding board is composed of the sole owner, his wife and a professional 
manager from the group. Interestingly enough, the owner is the Chairman of not 
only the holding board, but also of all the boards of the companies within the 
group, including those of the joint ventures. He has no other occupations and 
allocates all his time to closely following up the activities of his companies.
T here are no outsiders serving on the company boards. Intergroup interlocking 
is very common and used as a means of coordination. The general managers are 
members of their associated companies and also serve on the boards of other 
companies within the group. The demands of multiple membership together 
with the duties undertaken as general manager severely limits the time 
allocated to each activity. Such managers/directors tend to spend more of their 
time on the companies they manage and hence act more passive during the board 
meetings of the other companies. Since such a structure imposes substantial 
limits on the functionality and involvement of the boards, the holding 
management is planning to enable some professional managers to undertake 
multiple board memberships only and let the general managers concentrate on 
their company’s activities.
Formal board meetings are held at the company level. The program of the 
meetings is usually prepared in advance and distributed to the members. The 
general manager reports to the board and answers question raised by the board.
Holding 4:
H-4 is one of the leading holdings in Turkey, engaged in various business 
activities in petroleum, tourism, ship building, financial services and food 
industries. Its headquarters is located in Istanbul. H-4 is owned by two families. 
Three representatives of these two families serve on the holding board. Two of 
these shareholders work full time at the corporation and follow up with the daily 
activities as well. The third shareholder resides in United States and is closely 
affiliated with a large company there. However, he attends to each board
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meeting where he transfers his accumulated experience to facilitate the board 
proceedings. His efforts are perceived as valuable contribution by the other 
board members.
The other board members are made up of one insider, who is a professional 
manager that has worked with the company for many years and three outsiders. 
Two of these outsiders are university professors; one being an expert in law and 
the other in finance. One of these professors is closely affiliated with one of the 
owner farhilies, who has also introduced the second professor to the family and 
later to the board. The third outsider is a famous identity from the finance 
industry. He is also the owner of a bank, a well-known personality, and his 
presence in the board is highly appreciated by the members of both families.
The presence of general managers at the holding board is deliberately avoided 
because the owners believe that the decision makers and implementators should 
be separated. They perceive the board as a powerful managerial unit that will 
monitor, criticize and correct the steps taken by the general manager.
The board meetings take place once a month. The program is usually 
determined in advance. However, there are last minute additions most of the 
time. Ideally, the programs are received by the directors three days before the 
meeting. Nevertheless, on certain occasions, the programs reach the directors 
minutes before the meeting.
The Chairman of the board and the board member responsible for informing 
the board on the operational activities, work full time at the holding, as well as 
the professional manager who serves on the board. All these people are 
extremely knowledgeable on the day-to-day activities and hence are capable of 
solving the operational level problems as well. They work on project proposals 
and investment plans and leave the routine work to the general managers once 
the basics are clearly determined.
The two professor outsiders also provide consultancy service to middle level 
management and hence are involved in the activities of the corporation. Offices 
are also provided to these people to facilitate their involvement and contribution. 
The owners appreciate the contribution of these outsiders and emphasize that 
these people do not merely act as consultants but (are expected to and) do 
contribute as much as insiders. The third outsider, because of time restrictions, 
can not allocate too much of his time to the corporation. However, his 
background, personal experience, knowledge and image constitute valuable 
assets for the corporation.
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The owners usually penetrate to the boards of the companies within the group. 
However, intergroup interlocking is very rare and in fact is deliberately avoided 
in most cases. H-5 has established a formal reporting and budgeting system 
through which the general managers report to the holding board. Being 
responsible for the performance of the activities within the proposed budgets, the 
general managers are asked to account for any discrepancies.
Holding 5:
H-5 was originated in 1958 with the establishment of a transportation and 
contracting company. Today the business activities embrace publishing, 
television and radio, automotive, banking, insurance, trade and tourism. H-5 is 
based in Istanbul.
The holding’s role is to develop projects in new areas of investment and to 
provide consultancy on investment, finance, organization, management and 
marketing to the companies within the group. The holding board consists of 
nine members, including the owner, his wife and seven professional managers. 
Currently, there are no outsiders, but the top management reports that there is no 
deliberate avoidance. However, the presence of the outsiders on the holding 
board is not perceived as a crucial necessity at this point.
The holding also has an Executive Committee consisting of the owner and four 
professional managers. These four professionals also constitute the top 
management of the major companies in the group. Since all five members of the 
Executive Committee are also directors of the holding board, the Executive 
Committee meetings more or less simulate the board meetings. The existence of 
the professionals enable coordination and communication among the companies 
of the group.
The Executive Committee does not deal with the day-to-day activities of the 
companies. It is authorized to concentrate on strategic decisions, like the 
approval of the company budgets and investment plans, for instance. The 
professionals claim that the Executive Committee meetings have a very 
democratic style where criticisms and comments are welcomed by the owner. 
Once their budgets are approved, the companies are allowed to act on their own. 
However, discrepancies are monitored and questioned by the Executive 
Committee.
The owner of H-5 serves on the boards of the most important companies only. 
Other membership positions are filled out by professional mangers within the
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group. The general managers serve on the boards of the associated companies 
and sometimes on the board of a smaller company within the same group. The 
latter happens when a certain percentage of the stock of the smaller company is 
owned by the first company. When stock ownership linkage does not exist, 
intergroup interlocking is usually not observed.
One of the companies of the group is engaged in publishing one of the most 
popular daily newspapers of Turkey. This company’s board is made up of the 
owner and the top management of the newspaper. Due to the dynamic nature of 
the business, the board unofficially meets everyday. In contrast to the common 
practice, the newspaper board deals with day-to-day activities in addition to the 
strategic issues.
H-5 owns the majority of the shares of a company that produces original 
equipment and spare parts for the automotive industry in Turkey. The remaining 
stocks of the company is owned by another large holding and the rest is sold to 
public. The company board, consequently, includes professional managers from 
H-5 group of companies, in addition to a member of the other holding and a 
simple citizen representing the public shares. The owner of H-5 is not present in 
this company’s board.
The board of the bank in H-5 group of companies includes an outsider who has 
been elected for his vast experience in finance and banking. The general 
manager of the bank, according to the Law of Banks, is a natural member of the 
board. The remaining positions are allocated to the professional managers. The 
meetings take place twice a month. The programs are prepared in advance and 
sent to the directors 2-4 days before the board meeting.
Holding 6:
H-6 has been founded by two partners in 1959. The current business activities 
can be grouped into three categories: The first one includes construction,
machinery and erection, the second constitutes of textiles and chemicals and the 
third one is made up of prefabricated housing and minority interests. The 
headquarters is located in Istanbul.
The holding board consists of seven members, four of which are the two 
founders themselves and their family members and the remaining three are ex­
employees of H-6. These ex-employees have worked with H-6 for many years 
and know the corporation well. Along with their knowledge and experience.
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they bring in their per^ X)nal contacts. We have chosen to denote these people as 
insiders due to their close and long lasting affiliation with the holding.
In contrast to the ccitralized structure of many holdings examined, H-6 
assumes a democratic style and prefers to delegate more authority to the top 
management of the subsidiary companies. In this sense, the holding is more 
involved in coordinating the business activities in the most general sense; 
undertaking the role of a mediator when conflicts arise, enabling the application 
of consistent policies (for agreements with the labor unions, for instance), 
increasing the credibility of the subsidiary companies in the financial arena 
through stock ownership.
H-6 organization used to include a Coordinator, who was supposed to enable 
healthy information flow among the company boards and the holding board. 
However, this position has recently been eliminated since the Coordinator started 
acting like the general manager of all subsidiary companies, which in turn, shook 
the authority of the individual general managers. In present, the coordination 
among companies is established via intergroup interlocking.
The two founders do not necessarily take place in the company boards, except 
for crucial businesses where the Chairman position of one founder, together with 
his personal contacts contribute to the success of the projects undertaken.
The company boards consist of seven members all of which are professional 
managers. The general managers are natural members of the associated 
company boards. Intergroup interlocking is very common and special concern is 
shown to establish a multi-skilled board composition made up of members who 
are either knowledgeable in financial and legal affairs or are engineers.
Except for joint venture boards, the number of company board meetings do not 
exceed two or three within a year. The general manager possesses the authority 
to dictate his decisions as if they are the outcomes of the board meetings. There 
usually are no conflicts among the board members and the general manager’s 
proposals are frequently approved by the board. (The specifics pertaining to the 
composition and the processing of one of the joint venture’s board will be 
provided in the Joint Ventures section.)
Holding 7:
H-7 has originated from a one-man army company established to act in 
consulting and representation arenas and evolved into a holding with twenty-four 
subsidiary companies. Today these companies are operating in several 
businesses including petroleum, trade, construction, manufacturing and services
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businesses. The geogra al scope of the subsidiary companies includes 
Russian Federation and T ;h Republics together with Germany and Bulgaria. 
The headquarters is locate; Ankara.
95% of the shares of tl iolding belongs to one person and the remaining 
shares are owned by his re itives. The holding board consists of four members, 
where the main sharehol er undertakes the role of the Chairman and the 
remaining shareholders 1 oid the three other membership positions. Such a 
composition for the holding board leads to informal board meetings for the 
holding. In fact, the major shareholder possesses full authority to make strategic 
decisions for the holding and the twenty-four companies and is the only board 
member who is actively involved in the daily business activities of the holding.
It has been stated that both the owners and the top managers of H-7 do not 
appreciate the possible benefits outsiders can bring. Instead, H-7 management 
chooses to utilize the personal contacts of the major shareholder with the 
bureaucrats and the members of the parliament. Interestingly enough, the top 
management assumes a very skeptical approach towards the academicians, 
stating that the university professors’ consultancy do not help much since the 
professors’ perspectives are severely bounded and their background lacks 
practical experiences.
The strategic apex includes an Executive Committee made up of the major 
shareholder and the general managers of the most important subsidiary 
companies. All general managers are expected to report to this committee on 
matters related to the busing s es under their management. In turn, the Executive 
Committee makes :he stnuegic decisions and reports them to the general 
managers, who are then assigned with the implementation task.
No formal board meetings are held at the company level. The general 
managers present the projcoied budget, activities plan and cash flows to the 
Executive Committee for oproval. The Executive Committee checks the 
validity of these future prop sals and also evaluates the rate of realization of the 
past projections by comparing the expected data with the realized ones. The 
general managers are asked to report on the reasons behind any discrepancies.
Once a project proposal is submitted by the general manager of a subsidiary 
company, the general managers in the Executive Committee comment on overall 
issues and do not get involved in the specifics. More specifically, they try to 
transfer the related experience they have to this company management and warn 
the general manager against possible risks. For instance, they can list the points 
to be taken into account while doing business in a certain Turkish Republic,
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avoiding the repetition of' a mistakes that have been made before. They can
devote their experience and rsonal contacts in that country to the disposal of
the general manager vvho pr >ses the project.
The Executive Commiltee iso enables the achievement of self-appraisal and 
coordination among the memoer companies. Through mutual information flow, 
it becomes possible to unc >, er the weaknesses and to discover the strengths of 
the group. Informed decis m making leads to a more radical and coordinated 
management.
When necessary, the so-called “Extended Board Meetings” are held. All 
general managers are invited to such occasions in addition to the directors. Such 
meetings are reported to assume a very democratic atmosphere and evolve into 
means of recharging, especially for professional managers.
Intergroup interlocking is very common in H-7. Most of the time, the general 
manager of a Turkey-based subsidiary company serves on the board of a joint 
venture company. This manager/director is usually praised and motivated with 
stock ownership.
In spite of the existence of the Extended Board Meetings and the Executive 
Committee, the top management admits that most of the time, the joint decision 
of the general manager and the major shareholder determines the fate of a 
subsidiary company. As one of the top managers puts it, “the organization has 
failed to catch up with the rap id growth encountered”.
Holding 8:
H-8 is one of the large;; iicldings based in Ankara. Having started in the 
construction business, H-f has rapidly extended the scope of its business 
activities and become enga.'cd in tourism, health, commerce and insurance 
industries as well.
The holding board consists of ten members who are also shareholders of the 
corporation. Neither profes.sional managers nor outsiders serve on the board. 
The management is highly centralized and all ten shareholders are fully involved 
in the activities of the corporation. In fact, all ten shareholders hold executive 
positions in the corporation in addition to their board memberships.
It has been stated that the shareholders do not deliberately avoid having 
outsiders on the board. Nevertheless, the expected contribution of an outsider is 
limited with establishing crucial contacts through lobbying efforts and enabling
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the improvement of the public image of the corporation. Consequently, probable 
candidates are likely to be selected among ex-bureaucrats or ex-ministers.
All ten shareholders do not serve on all subsidiary company boards. In fact, 
different businesses are assigned to one shareholder (or a group of shareholders), 
where this shareholder (or the group) becomes a member of the boards of all 
subsidiary companies in this business. These assignments are based on the 
background and related experience of the shareholders.
The Chairman of the holding board acts as the Coordinator as well. The 
Coordinator has two assistants who are also shareholders of the corporation. 
These three people and two professional managers form the Executive 
Committee, which constitutes the key unit in the organizational structure. These 
three shareholders in the Executive Committee are members of the boards of all 
subsidiary companies.
The strategic decisions of a subsidiary company are taken by the members of 
the Executive Committee, together with the participation of the shareholders 
responsible for that particular business. Next, these decisions are rubber- 
stamped at the monthly board meetings of the associated company. Such a 
mechanism endows the two professionals in the Executive Committee with 
considerable authority compared to those shareholders who are not members of 
the Executive Committee: These two professionals contribute to the strategy 
formulation for all businesses whereas the aforementioned shareholders usually 
concentrate on strategies for the businesses that are assigned to them.
Intergroup interlocking is not very common among the boards of the 
subsidiary companies. However, interlocks are used as a means to achieve 
coordination and strategic consistency among the subsidiary companies which 
are in the same business.
General managers are members of the associated company boards. 
Nevertheless, their authority is severely limited since the strategic decisions are 
made at the upper levels of the organization. Besides, since all of the 
shareholders work full time at the corporation, the activities of the general 
managers are closely monitored.
Holding 9:
H-9 encompasses about 40 companies. The scope of the business activities of 
the group includes machinery, construction, defense, electricity, communication.
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etc. The group has business contacts in international markets like Malaysia, 
Libya, Russian Federation and Yemen, in addition to its businesses in Turkey.
H-9 has been originated by two founders who are both above the age of 85 
today. In order to enable the survival of the group of companies over the years 
and generations, these two owners have decided to engage in institutionalization 
efforts and have left the management of the group in the hands of professional 
managers. Two educational foundations have been established and are financed 
by the profits generated by the group of companies.
In present, these two foundations are the shareholders of the holding. 
Accordingly, the board members of the holding are elected by the boards of 
these foundations. Only one of the founders is a member of the board of one of 
these foundations.
H-9 seems to have gone a long way toward institutionalization. A group of 
leading principles, called Magna Carta among the members of the group, shapes 
the management of the group. The H-9 Magna Carta declares that
no shareholder can hold a board membership, 
no general manager can hold a board membership,
boards define the general framework, formulate strategies, make 
investment decisions and budget approvals,
the implementation of the board decisions is undertaken by the general 
managers, no board can interfere with the execution phase, 
intergroup interlocks can occur, however the number of board 
memberships hold by a person can not exceed three, 
the holding board consists of outsiders,
the members of the company boards are professional managers who do not 
hold managerial positions within the group.
The holding board is made up of outsiders only, since it has been proven by 
experience that the insider members tend to interfere with the execution phase. 
These outsiders are university professors, top level managers of other 
corporations, and retired general managers of financial institutions. Knowledge 
and experience in finance and/or law are the criteria for election, personal 
affiliations with the owners is not a critical issue. In present, the board size is set 
to seven.
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The holding board meets twice a month. The date of the following meeting is 
scheduled at the end of the former, so that a consensus can be reached and the 
gathering of the majority is enabled. Although all members are outsiders, 
absenteeism is not that frequent to hinder the board proceedings.
Monthly reports are sent to the holding members. Except the periods in which 
the company budgets are evaluated, the general managers are not invited to the 
meetings of the holding board. There are coordinator positions within the 
holding, however, these are designed for the handling of the bureaucratic 
activities only.
Interestingly enough, no board member has stock ownership. In fact, the 
motivation ol' the board members with stock ownership was a method tested by 
II-9 in the previous years. However, it has been noticed that such a practice 
leads to inner conflicts as those with higher shares tend to seek more authority 
and interfere with the execution phase. Consequently, H-9 has chosen to 
constitute its holding and company boards of professional managers only.
The general managers are not board members, however they attend to all board 
meetings to report on certain issues. The company boards meet at least once a 
month. The frequency of these meetings are increased with the intensity of the 
business activities.
The members of the company board do not hold other managerial positions 
within the group. Nevertheless, multiple memberships are allowed as long as 
they are limited to three. The main reason behind interlocking is not the 
achievement of coordination among the companies, but better utilization of the 
human resources. In this framework, only the professional managers with the 
strongest background and vast expertise are asked to serve on multiple boards.
All companies have an Executive Committee made up of the general manager 
and his/her deputies. Execution Committees have their formal meetings where 
they make decisions concerning the implementation of the board decisions. The 
general manager is responsible from putting the committee decisions into 
application.
VI.2. Joint Ventures
During our interviews, we realized that the joint ventures have powerful 
Executive Committees and hence concentrated on the composition and 
functioning of these committees. We chose to include the status of the joint 
venture as an internal contingency since we observed its impact on the board
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structure. In addition, we asked questions pertaining to the absenteeism problem 
of the joint venture boards together with the measures taken to facilitate 
consensus among the member parties. The results of our interviews with the 
members of the joint venture boards lead us to emphasize the following issues in 
our evaluation:
the status of the joint venture
the associated shares of the parties
the existence of a board or a similar council
the existence, composition and the authority of the Executive Committee
the difficulties encountered in gathering the board members
the measures taken against the absenteeism of the board members
the application of alternate membership concept
the measures taken to facilitate consensus
the formality of the board meetings
the existence of well-defined programs for the meetings
the board membership of the general managers
Below, we provide a detailed description of the board practices in each of these 
joint ventures.
Joint Venture 1:
JV-1 was founded in 1967 in Istanbul. The initial mission was the production 
of busses and minibuses to meet the transportation vehicles need of Turkey. 
36% of the shares were held by one of the most famous German transportation 
vehicle firms, and the rest belonged to two Turkish corporations. In 1984, JV-1 
became the General Representative of all the products of the aforementioned 
German firm. Meanwhile, a Turkish foundation joined the list of the 
shareholders.
Shortly after, one of the initial shareholders sold its shares and another Turkish 
corporation, a private bank, a state institution and a Grand Cayman based 
corporation owned by a Saudi Arabian entrepreneur became shareholders. At 
the same time, the German partner became the owner of about 65% of the shares. 
With this new arrangement, the number of shareholders increased to seven.
JV-1 has extended its scope of business activities and got involved in the 
production of diesel motors and trucks. The number of its personnel has reached
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to 2300. In present, the shareholders are the same as listed above, except the 
private bank who has recently sold his share.
The changes in the number of shareholders has been reflected to the size of the 
board and the organization of the strategic apex over the years. During the 
foundation years, when there were three shareholders only, the board had three 
members. When the number of shareholders increased to seven, the number of 
directors was increased to twelve. Succeedingly, a management organ called the 
Directors Committee was established.
The Directors Committee acts more or less like an Executive Committee but it 
possesses more authority since it is endowed with all (except the non- 
transferable) rights of the board. With the current distribution of the shares, the 
Chairman of the Committee is German. The German members of the Directors 
Committee do not hold other managerial positions within the organization.
The committee consists of five members with equal voting power. However, 
in case of a 3 to 2 voting score, where the minority group includes the Chairman 
of the Committee, the preference of the Chairman determines the result. Such a 
system is brought in to seek collaboration and avoid the occurrence of 
bottlenecks in the decision making units. The organization also includes a 
General Coordinator who organizes the interactions of the firm with its 
environment.
The company board, which has delegated a good deal of its authority to the 
Directors Committee meets twice a year. Since the German directors of the 
board hold top level managerial positions within the parent German firm, it 
becomes very difficult for these people to arrange their schedule in order to 
attend the board meetings in Turkey. The solution to this problem has been 
found in alternate membership. In very simple terms, when the director can not 
attend the meeting his/her alternate is invited.
In fact, according to article 312, the concept of alternate membership for 
corporation boards is in contradiction with the Turkish Law of Commerce (Eriş, 
1987). The General Coordinator of JV-1 reports that this item has been 
introduced to avoid the delegation of all the board authority to one member and 
hence to eliminate the danger of an authoritarian management within the board. 
He admits that such a rationale may have been valid when the Commercial Law 
has been prepared, but points out that the circumstances of today’s business 
world requires alterations. He also recalls submitting a related proposal during 
the period of Turgut Özal government. Nevertheless, no modifications have
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been made as of today and JV-1 has elected alternates for the German members 
only.
Joint Venture 2:
JV-2 is established with 60 % Saudi and 40% Turkish capital participation. 
The shares of the Turkish party are held by two state banks, some businessmen 
and private corporations whereas the Saudi shares are owned by 60 Saudi 
Arabian businessmen and a special public investment fund.
The organization aims to promote trade and investments between Saudi Arabia 
and Turkey. I he headquarters is located in Istanbul. The objectives are stated 
as participation in the capital and management or the formation of joint ventures 
to undertake all types of commercial, industrial, real estate investments, or 
financial transactions and services. The corporation has a number of equity 
participations in the industrial and service sectors and is engaged in a number of 
trade deals between the two countries.
The board consists of ten members. Four of these members are from Turkey 
and the rest are from Saudi Arabia. Of these four Turkish members, two are the 
representatives of the first shareholder bank, one represents the second 
shareholder bank, and one comes from a shareholder corporation. The Chairman 
of the board has resided in Turkey as the ex-ambassador of Saudi Arabia, and 
therefore is familiar with the domestic circumstances.
The shareholder state banks are represented by their general manager at the 
JV-2’s board. This situation has lead to unstability in the composition of the 
company board, since the general manager of one of these banks have changed 
three times, and the other four times in the last five years. Naturally, political 
considerations constitute the underlying reason for such short duration of 
service. This unstability in the company board has seriously disrupted the flow 
of the business activities, and has limited the contribution of these two 
shareholder banks.
The board meetings used to be held in every month. In present the gatherings 
happen once in three months. The top management emphasizes the cost of these 
meetings to the company, pointing out that the airfares and first class 
accommodations of six Saudi Arabian members do cost a good deal. The 
general manager sadly records that the annual costs of these board meetings 
exceed 30% of the total company expenditures. He believes that unless prompt
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measures are takeiî, such extravagant expenditures will get somewhat 
institutionalized.
There also exists an apparent inconsistency between the number of employees 
of the company (4), and the number of board members (10). The general 
manager states that the company has a lot to gain by shrinking its size to half 
Such an arrangement will not only ease reaching a consensus but also decrease 
the cost of the board meetings.
The general manager of the comnanv is not a member of the board. However, 
both the general manager and his deputy are present during the board meetings 
to provide detailed information and bring explanations on the questionable 
issues. The board meetings have a well-defined program, which is sent to the 
members a week before the meetings.
Communication problems and cultural differences may hinder the processing 
of the board: The official language of the board meetings is English. However, 
especially when the discussions get steamy, the Turkish members end up 
gathering in one comer discussing among themselves in Turkish. The 
atmosphere is democratic and exciting discussions take place most of the time.
Another problem stems from the differences in the mind-sets of the members: 
It usually is difficult for the Turkish bureaucrats to understand the Saudi Arabian 
businessmen, and vice versa. The Saudi Arabians are usually more pro-active, 
they enable the company to make use of their personal contacts, easing 
procurement and sales activities. On the other hand, the Turkish shareholder 
banks, too busy with changing general managers, have been reluctant to use their 
credible images and contacts to secure resources for the company.
Since it is both expensive and difficult, hence impractical, to have frequent 
board meetings, an Executive Committee has been established. This committee 
has two Saudi Arabian and one Turkish member. One of the Saudi Arabian 
members is the Chairman of the board, who spends most of his time in Turkey. 
Both the other Saudi Arabian member and the Turkish member have alternates, 
since they are both businessmen with busy schedules.
The Executive Committee executes the action plan prescribed by the board. It 
is authorized to make decisions within the framework provided by the board, but 
it can not alter the framework. This committee also evaluates probable projects 
and proposes the feasible ones to the board.
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Joint Venture 3:
JV-3 was originated with the agreement of one Turkish corporation (H-6) and 
one US company to jointly undertake a highway project. The joint venture will 
be disseminated after the project is completed. The partners have 50% share 
each.
JV-3 has embodies an Execution Committee that works like a board. This 
committee consists of four members, two from each company. Although 
companies are represented by two members, each company has a single vote. 
Such an arrangement is used to avoid interruptions that can block the decision 
making mechanism due to the absenteeism of the members.
In this system, the score of any voting is either 1 to 1, or 2 to 0. In the former 
case, i.e. when a tie occurs, the leading company has the advantage to make the 
decision. The leader firm is the Turkish firm in this joint venture, as stated in the 
joint venture contract. Note that the notion of “leader firm” makes sense for the 
case of a 50-50 partnership, since the partner with the majority of the shares 
prevails otherwise.
The initial joint venture contract also assigns the role of the referee to an 
impartial organization. The referee organization is the Switzerland Chamber of 
Commerce, in this case. When unsatisfied with the decision taken by the leading 
firm in case of a 1 to 1 score, the other partner can apply to the referee 
organization within thirty days. If the referee decides that the leading firm has 
done wrong, either the decision is taken back or the losses of the partner are 
compensated by the leading firm.
The Executive Committee holds formal meetings with well-prepared programs. 
The date of the next meeting is either decided at the end of the prior meeting or 
announced by formal invitation. The meetings usually last a few days, since the 
committee visits the construction site to control the progress of the project.
During each meeting, the Project Manager presents a detailed report to the 
committee about the completed stages of the project, accounting for any delays. 
He also informs the members on the cash flows, the debt situation and on other 
financial indicators. The decisions to be taken for the progress of the project are 
also proposed together with rationale.
Sometimes, due to the nature of the project undertaken, it becomes very crucial 
to take prompt decisions. The Project Manager makes a proposal and asks for 
the approval of the committee members of the leading firm. Unless rejected by 
these members, the proposal is faxed to the foreign members of the committee.
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upon their approval, the action is taken as if the related decision has been made 
at the committee meeting.
Vi.3. Small Firms
Four small corporations have also been included in the scope of this 
exploratory research in order to examine the composition and functioning of the 
boards and the degree of institutionalization accomplished. Two of these 
companies operate in the mining industry and the remaining two are construction 
firms.
The outcomes of our interviews have enabled the derivation of a profile for the 
management of these small corporations. Naturally, the sample is far too small 
to give way to generalizations, but still the following items can provide a starting 
point for more extensive research.
The small corporations that have been selected can be characterized as follows;
They are basically family businesses, disguised in the corporation identity. 
The board consists of the shareholders only. In most instances, the founder 
gives minority shares to his family and relatives, so that the legal 
requirement for the existence of a minimum of five shareholders will be 
fulfilled.
The general manager position is occupied by the major shareholder. When 
there actually is one founder, as described above, he automatically 
becomes the general manager. In case of multiple major shareholders, one 
becomes the general manager, and others assist.
There are not any professional managers. Mostly due to the age of the 
organization, qualified personnel has not been raised yet.
As a natural consequence of the above situation, centralization is at its 
peak.
The existence of the board arises from a perfunctory need to fulfill the 
legal requirements.
There are no formal board meetings. In most instances, the decisions are 
taken on the spur of the moment and then recorded as if they are the 
outcomes of the board meetings. In this system, the meetings documents 
(that are supposed to contain the contents of each meeting together with the 
decisions made) are replaced by management’s diaries, where the decisions 
are recorded after the related actions are taken.
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VIA. Independent Cases
We have also included four organization with different ownership structures 
and board practices into our sample. The special features of these organizations 
(referred to as independent cases) are provided in Figure 5. Below, we provide 
detailed descriptions of each of these cases.
Independent Case 1:
Our first case (IC-1) relates to a certain group of companies that have 
originated from the same core business, but have not been coordinated by a 
holding yet. Nevertheless, the organization and management shows a good deal 
of parallelism with those of the holdings we have focused on and one feels the 
existence of a latent holding within the structure. In fact, the owners also 
indicate that they are seriously considering the establishment of a holding 
company that wilt orchestrate all the business activities of the companies in the 
group.
IC-1 is a leading name in housing construction in Turkey. It is well-known 
with its concern for quality and after sales service. IC-1 has the capacity to 
produce 2000-4000 houses/year and meets both the domestic and the 
international demand.
The core company of the group has eight major shareholders who jointly hold 
75% of the shares. The rest is distributed among twelve other shareholders. The 
board of this company consists of five members who are all major shareholders. 
The owners do not seem to expect much of the outsiders.
An interesting point about the company relates to the identity of its owners. Of 
the first founders of the company, only one person has kept his shares and is still 
a member of the board. The others have sold their shares to managers who have 
worked for many years in this company. Since the majority of the shareholders 
are at the same time past/present employees of the company, they are highly 
involved and extremely motivated.
Three members of the board form the Executive Committee as well. One of 
them is the general manager, the other two are his deputies. One of the members 
of the board points out that the Executive Committee has not been formally 
established, instead it has evolved spontaneously. Since the three members of 
the Executive Committee were the only board members who worked full time at
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the company, they became more involved in the details of the business activities 
and later in time acquired the authority to make decisions on the spot.
Although the other board members appreciate the contributions of the 
Executive Committee, they believe that the embedding of the Executive 
Committee within the board leads to a good deal of inconvenience, especially 
when the performance of the top level management is discussed and evaluated 
on the board. However, they note that the middle level managers are not 
sufficiently trained and experienced to take over. Once these managers are 
prepared, the owners are willing to delegate authority to a younger generation of 
professional managers and separate the responsibilities of the owners and the 
managers. Such a delegation is also expected to endow the owners with extra 
time which they can then use to develop visions and formulate strategies.
IC-1 encompasses a separate managerial unit. Higher Council of Shareholders 
that is positioned above the board in the organization chart. This unit consists of 
eight major shareholders and two minor shareholders and acts like a latent 
holding, coordinating the activities of the companies within the group. Each 
major shareholder in this council holds a membership in the boards of one or 
more of the companies in the group and hence enable mutual communication. 
The owners try to make sure that this council defines the general framework only 
and does not get involved with the operational specifics of the companies.
The company boards consist of a major shareholder, a minor shareholder and a 
few professional managers from within. The general managers are not members 
of the board, however, they attend the meetings to report on operational issues.
The board of the core company meets in every two weeks, whereas the other 
boards gather once a month. The frequency of these meetings are arranged due 
to the intensity of the activities during the year. All meetings are formal with 
pre-defined programs. Members come prepared and have the right to propose 
the discussion of additional items during the meeting.
A General Coordinator position does not exist within the organizational 
structure. However, different coordinators for electricity, machinery, equipment 
and projects have been assigned to facilitate the allocation of resources among 
the construction sites.
Independent Case 2:
Our second choice for an independent choice is a corporation operating in the 
food industry. The mission of the company is to enable exportation of the
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agricultural products of Manyas-Gonen region. Originally, the majority of the 
company stock (67%) belonged to a leading state bank and its equity 
participations, the remaining portion was owned by the farmer citizens of the 
region. Recently, the aforementioned bank has transferred its shares to the 
Public Participation Fund, which resulted in substantial ehanges in the 
eomposition of the board due to political considerations. Here we ehoose to 
describe the structure and processing of the company board before this change in 
the ownership structure to exemplify how the representation of a state enterprise 
at a eompany board unfolds.
The above distribution of the shares endows the shareholder bank with the 
authority to have its representatives elected to the board. Accordingly, the board 
is made up of seven members, six of which are the top level employees of the 
bank. Note that unlike many directors of the private corporation boards, these 
representatives’ earnings are not correlated with the profits of the company. No 
matter how the company performs, their compensation paid by the shareholder 
institution does not change. One member is a well-known businessman, whose 
board membership has been linked to political considerations.
The frequency of the board meetings are held once a month. Extra meetings 
can be scheduled when required. Although not a board member, the general 
manager attends all board meetings, informs and reports to the directors. The 
assistant general managers or other top level employees of the eompany can also 
be invited to the board meetings to help highlight certain issues.
The general manager proposes the program of the board meetings. The 
Chairman of the board determines the contents based on this proposal. All 
directors are sent a copy of the program of the meetings in advance, so that they 
will get prepared.
The burden rests on the shoulders of the Chairman of the board and the general 
manager. They work like an informal Executive Committee to implement the 
decisions of the board. Although the Chairman holds an exeeutive position in the 
shareholder bank as well, he has to allocate time to continuously keep in touch 
with the general manager, monitor his performance. The credibility and special 
contacts of the bank is also utilized to seeure resources for the company, extend 
the scope of its business activities both in domestic and international markets.
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Independent Case 3:
This case is concerned with one of the most important mining corporations in 
Turkey that was financed by The World Bank during its foundation. The World 
Bank has then stipulated the establishment of an organization that will rest on 
the warranty of the state on one side, and act free from state intervention at the 
same time. Accordingly, a special law has been prepared for this corporation, 
identifying it as a private enterprise no matter what percentage of its shares are 
held by the state. Hence, no organization of the state has the authority to audit 
this corporation’s activities. This special status of the corporation has made its 
managerial structure worthwhile to analyze.
Although the state intervention has been avoided as described above, it is not 
totally eliminated since the government owns 51% of the shares of the 
corporation. The remaining shares are distributed among numerous individual 
stockholders. Since it is very difficult for these individual investors to agree 
upon a certain candidate, the state does not encounter much resistance in having 
its candidates elected to the board.
The state influence on the determination of the board members leads to the 
reflection of the present government structure to the company board. More 
specifically, the followers of the governing political party occupy the board 
membership positions. One ex-manager in the corporation sarcastically remarks 
that the current composition of the board depicts a micro model of the coalition 
government.
One of the ex-Chairman of the board of this corporation reports that the board 
meetings have been as frequent as once a month, depending on the intensity of 
the business activities. He also voices interesting comments on the board 
membership of the general manager: During the period of his membership, the 
board has approved the membership of a certain general manager. This situation 
hindered in-depth discussions on the performance of the company and the 
general manager, since some members hesitated to raise criticisms in his 
presence. Later in time, the board decided to appoint somebody else as the 
general manager because they were unsatisfied with the performance of the 
former one. According to the law, the board had the authority to dismiss the 
general manager, however his board membership could not be cancelled since he 
was elected by the shareholders at the annual meeting. Hence, the directors were 
forced to continue working with this ex-general manager until the following
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elections. Naturally, both the morale and the efficiency of the board was 
damaged.
Independent Case 4:
This case is concerned with a foundation that was established in 1991, with the 
joint efforts of public and private enterprises, and in accordance with the 
agreement signed by I'he World Bank and the Turkish government. In present, 
the foundation has a capital of 1.5 billion TL, in addition to a 43.3 million US 
dollars, that have been transferred from The World Bank.
The organization aims to
• empower the scientific and technological infrastructure of the country
• support and motivate the R&D efforts of the Turkish industrial institutions
• define, monitor and support the high priority fields for scientific and 
technological R&D
• capitalize on the interlinks among the public organizations, private firms 
and the universities
The foundation has 38 founders; 23 private enterprises, 8 persons, 4 chambers 
and associations, and 3 public institutions. 51% of the foundations capital is 
financed by the private sector, 39% by the public, and 10% by the chambers and 
associations. These founders elect the board members for a period of three 
years.
The board has nine members. According to the Articles of the Association, a 
minimum of five members should represent the private sector. Six
representatives have been selected to the first board of the foundation. All of 
these people are the directors of the most important chambers and associations of 
the country. The founders have deliberately made such a selection to enable the 
integrity and support of the main interest groups. Some of these members are 
not even founders, and some of them pursue their board membership although 
during the last three years they have left their positions within the 
aforementioned associations or chambers. (At the time this interview was 
conducted, the new elections were about to be made.)
The remaining three members of the board represent the public sector. One 
member represents the Treasury, the other is from Turkish Scientific and 
Technological Research Institution, and the last is from Small and Medium 
Industry Development Organization. The representative of the Treasury has a
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privileged vote; no decisic s taken unless approved by this member. The 
origins of this privilege can j traced back to the capital that is transferred to the 
state from The World Bank, or the disposal of the foundation.
The board meets only o c in every two months, since all members are top 
managers with busy schedules and it usually gets very difficult to align the 
conflicting schedules. Absenteeism is a serious problem for the board since it 
blocks the board proceedings. The adoption of the alternate membership 
application will be proposed in the following meeting of the founders.
The foundation also has an Executive Committee consisting of the Chairman 
of the board, Director of the Turkish Scientific and Technological Research 
Institution, and the Secretary General of the foundation. Formally, the board 
owns the authority. Nevertheless, it delegates this authority to the Executive 
Committee with the consensus of the board members. The Secretary General of 
the foundation is not a member of the board, yet in practice, he possesses as 
much authority as the other two members of the Executive Committee. The 
agreement of two of the members of this committee is usually sufficient to take 
even the most crucial decisions.
Board meetings last about four hours. Since all members are very 
knowledgeable people with vast expertise in their narticular fields, they always 
have too much to say and enjoy talking with each other. The unusual 
composition of the board necessitates close interaction of bureaucrats and 
businessmen. Apparently, a cultural difference prevails. However, contrary to 
what is expected, the bureaucrats turn out to be more flexible, whereas the 
businessman favor more paperwork. The Secretary General of the foundation 
explains this paradox by pointing out that the bureaucrats on the board represent 
the younger generation, who have quickly climbed the steps toward the strategic 
apex. The businessmen on the board, however, come from an older generation 
that is more conservative and formalist. Besides, its the businessmen who show 
the most absenteeism, and it is the bureaucrats who keep the board going.
A major difference of this foundation board from the other boards we have 
studied concerns with the compensation of the directors. The directors receive no 
compensation, and on top of that, they have to pay for their traveling expenses 
themselves.
In every three months, the foundation sends a report to the board members, 
informing them on the status of the financed projects. In addition, all meetings 
have a pre-defined program that is mailed to the directors before the meetings, 
enabling them enough time to get prepared. However, businessmen members
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most probably do not spen ‘ lOO much time with analyzing the details, due to 
time restrictions. They reh -n the judgement of the Executive Committee most 
of the time.
VII. EVALUATION
Below, we provide an : . aiuation of our findings together with possible 
interpretations of the phenomena observed. The first section pertains to the 
board attributes and the second relates to the roles of the boards.
VII. 1. Evaluation of the Board Attributes
Table II in the Appendix enables the comparison of the 9 holding boards and 
their associated company boards, on the basis of the features determined before.
The analysis of the table shows that only 3 out of 9 holding boards have 
outsider members. Moreover, in one of these 3 boards, the outsiders serve as 
consultants only, and are not included into the strategy formulation process. 
The outsiders serving on the other two boards fully contribute, in fact the board 
consists of all outsiders in one of these two cases.
Expertise in finance, law and economic is usually the most significant 
prerequisite for eligibility of the outsiders. Nevertheless, the affiliation of the 
outsiders with the owners of the corporation also plays an important role.
University professors tend to be the first group, the companies in search of 
outsider board members turn to. Leading names from the finance industry, and 
top managers of other corporations constitute the other origins for the outsiders.
Most owne-'j and top managers have expressed their doubts about the 
outsiders’ coniriDuiion. Most of them believe that the contribution of the 
outsiders will be severely limited by the time they can allocate to the activities of 
the corporation. Few owners/managers have sincerely admitted that they do not 
believe in the virtues of the outsiders at all.
All holding boards considered posses significant managerial and technical 
expertise. This potential might constitute the underlying reason for the 
reluctance of the company management toward including outsiders.
As depicted in Figure 2, the holdings studied have a few major shareholders in 
general. Hence, owner representation in the board is extremely high. 3 of the 9 
holding boards consist of owners only, and 4 boards consist of owners and 
professional managers. Only one holding board has accepted the principle of
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having no owners on the board, and one has elected the ex-managers of the 
group and the owners as the board members. (Note that the ex-managers are 
also considered as insiders in Table II.)
The degree of board involvement records high for 7 out of 9 holding boards. 
The remaining boards include the family member(s) of the significant 
shareholder who is the key member of the board. In one of these two cases, only 
this key member engages in the business activities of the corporation, leading to 
a partial board involvement. In the second case, both the key member and the 
professional managers on the board are involved, however, the attempts still 
remain partial.
In 5 out ol 9 cases, the holding companies include a Coordinator position 
within their organization. However, the functions of the Coordinator varies 
among these 5 organizations, and ranges from technical tasks to bureaucratic 
ones.
Again in 5 out of 9 cases, the existence of an Executive Committee has been 
observed. In 2 out of these 5 cases, this committee gets very powerful, and can 
even use most of the authority of the board. In both of these cases, the 
committees are made up of the owners and the professional managers, who are 
also the members of the board.
6 out of 9 holding companies hold formal board meetings. In the two holdings 
mentioned above, the decisions taken at the meetings of the Executive 
Committee prevails. Since these committees consist of those members who 
work full time at the corporation, the remaining members of the board tend to 
approve their initiative.
When the boards of the companies within the groups are considered, a striking 
observation pertains to the general manager’s board membership. Only in a 
single case, are ihe general managers deliberately kept out of the company 
boards.
The company boards do not generally include outsiders, except for the case of 
partnerships or joint ventures. Only in 1 of the 9 cases, the board consists of 
professional managers who do not hold executive positions within the group.
In 7 out of 9 cases, formal board meetings are held. In one of the remaining 
two cases, the sole owner takes all decisions, with the counseling of the general 
manager. In the other case, the general managers have great authority and 
independence, and make significant strategic decisions with the consent of the 
owners.
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The owners seem to use their board membership as a means of controlling the 
subsidiary companies. In 5 out of 9 cases, the owners serve on the boards of at 
least one of these companies. The owners generally choose to take place in the 
boards of the core businesses. In one extreme case, the owner is the chairman of 
all the boards of the subsidiary companies. In case of multiple major 
shareholders, the board representation can be allocated among the members 
based on their level of expertise and interest.
Intergroup interlocks seem to serve as a means of establishing coordination 
among the companies. In 7 out of 9 cases, interlocking is a common practice. In 
1 out of these 7 cases, there is a limit on the maximum number of board 
memberships a director can hold.
Table III in the Appendix enables the comparison of the 3 joint venture boards 
on the basis of the features determined before. Note that two of these joint 
ventures refer to actual companies, while the last joint venture’s life ceases at the 
end of the project undertaken.
The analysis of the table reveals that the Executive Committees play a leading 
role in the management of the joint ventures. In JV-1, the Executive Committee 
possesses all except the non-transferable rights of the board, while in JV-3, such 
a committee totally replaces the board.
The most significant problem of the joint venture boards tend to be the 
absenteeism of the board members. Since the directors of the joint venture 
boards have significant managerial positions within the parent companies most 
of the time, they have very busy schedules, and it usually becomes very difficult 
to agree upon a meeting date. In 2 out of 3 cases, alternate membership has been 
used to remedy any inconvenience that can arise. In JV-3, the voting system is 
arranged in such away that the absence of the representatives will cause the 
minimum interruption in the flow of the decision making process.
In contrast to the holding boards, the joint ventures hold formal meetings with 
pre-determined programs. Besides, the general managers are not given board 
memberships. However, they are asked to attend the board meeting to report on 
the questionable issues.
Since the small firms and the independent cases have already been evaluated 
on the basis of the board attributes in the previous section, the related issues will 
not be repeated here.
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VI 1.2. Evaluation of the Board Roles
Table IV in the Appendix comparatively explains how and to what extend the 
service, control, and strategy roles are executed by the selected holding boards.
Recall that the service role of the boards consists of interacting with the 
company’s external environment, improving company reputation and counseling 
the top management. In 8 out of 9 cases considered, the service role of the board 
rests upon the shoulders of the owners, and realized through their personal 
contacts, prestige, and credibility. The major emphasis is on enabling interaction 
of the firm with its environment, and securing the crucial resources. In the 
remaining case, where the board consists of outsiders only, the emphasis of the 
service role lies on counseling the top management only. Basically, the outsider 
members are asked to use their experience and knowledge to consult the top 
managers.
The control role, on the other hand, relates to the monitoring and evaluating 
the performance of the company and its top managers. In 2 out of 9 cases, this 
role is conducted via the Executive Committee. However, since the Executive 
Committees include top managers as well, the overall mechanism works more 
like a means for self-control. In 4 other cases, the owners attempt to use their 
membership at the company boards to attain control over the top managers. In 
these cases, the board’s control role is totally delegated to the owners. In 2 
cases, where the general managers possess considerable authority, the control 
role of the board is not fully carried out. In the remaining case, where the 
holding board consists of all outsiders, the control mechanisms relate only to the 
general issues. As for the specifics of the business activities, the general 
managers are controlled by the associated company boards.
Recall that the strategy role supports the active involvement of the boards in 
the strategy formulation process. In 6 out of 9 cases studied, all members of the 
board seem to contribute to the process of strategy formulation. However, these 
6 cases, also include the holding boards that are made up of owners only, which 
in turn, means that the owners determine the fate of the corporation after all. In 
two other extreme cases, in spite of the existence of the board, the major 
shareholder of the corporation makes all strategic decisions. Strangely enough, 
the owners of one holding company insist on keeping the strategic decision 
making process as a family matter and do not let the outsiders interfere.
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Table V in the Appendix comparatively evaluates how and to what extend the 
service, control, and strategy roles are executed by the selected joint venture 
boards.
The emphasis of the service role seems to rest on different aspects for the 
three joint ventures examined. In JV-1, for instance, the technical and 
managerial experience of the board members are used to counsel the top 
management. The Saudian partners of JV-2, bring in their business contacts to 
facilitate the company’s access to crucial resources. The Turkish party in JV- 
3, being a member of a well-known group of companies, devotes its strong 
relationships with the members of the same group to this joint venture’s 
disposal, making the external environment less volatile for the organization.
The control role, on the other hand, does not seem to be fully performed. 
Since at least half of the members of the board reside in other countries, the 
physical distance gets in the way. Besides, most of these directors are 
employed elsewhere and hence have very busy schedules. Due to time 
limitations, they may not be able to follow up with the details of the activities 
of the corporation. These boards usually rely on Executive Committees to 
carry out the.se business activities. The control mechanisms work as these 
committees or the general managers present formal reports to the board and 
attend the board meetings to answer question. Only for JV-3, the control 
mechanism seems to be more strict due to the nature of the project undertaken.
The strategy role is taken very seriously by the joint venture boards. 
Decisions taken reflect the results of the participative effort shown. Directors 
of each party realize that they are elected as representatives of their 
corporation and act with consciousness and deliberation.
Table VI in the Appendix evaluates how and to what extend the service, 
control, and strategy roles are executed by the boards of the small firms and 
the independent cases.
As mentioned before, the management of the small firms exhibit one man 
domination, where the owners act both as the decision makers and the 
implementators. Even these owners confess that centralization, coupled with 
the lack of formal control mechanisms, lead to suboptimal performance. 
However, most owners remark that their organizations are too young to reside 
well-trained managers, and delegation of authority to the unprepared personnel 
can lead to disasters.
Recall that IC-1 refers to a group of companies that experience the pre­
holding period. As also noted before, the structure and managerial style shows
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similarities with those of the holding companies considered. Table VII in the 
Appendix lays out these commonalties by providing an evaluation of IC-1 based 
on the board attributes.
Similar to many holding boards examined, the service role of the IC-1 board is 
realized via the personal links of the owners with the environment. The control 
role is performed through the assignment of the board members to the company 
boards. The strategy role, on the other hand, is undertaken seriously by all board 
members.
As for IC-2, the representative of the shareholder state bank holds the chairman 
position, and performs the service role of the board by activating the special 
contacts and accountability of the state bank. The control role of the board also 
rests substantially on this director, since the other board members usually do not 
follow up with the specifics of the execution. Similarly, the strategy role of the 
board tends to be delegated to the collaboration of the chairman of the board and 
the general manager.
The shares owned by the state play a crucial role on the performance of the 
roles of the board for IC-3. On one side, the board members’ affihation with the 
government facilitates the conduct of the service role. On the other side, the 
strategic decisions may be influenced to show alignment with the government 
preferences. The proper execution of the control role is severely restricted by the 
general manager’s assignment of a board membership.
The performance of the strategy role for the board of IC-4 is enhanced with the 
presence of very powerfiil bureaucrats and businessmen at the foundation’s 
board. These people not only contribute via the accumulation originating from 
the positions they occupy in various state and private enterprises, but also through 
enriching the board proceedings by transferring their experience and knowledge. 
The board usually does not hesitate to delegate authority to the Executive 
Committee and mostly rely on this committee’s discretion. All board members 
fully contribute to the strategy formulation process.
VIII. RESEARCH PERSPECTIVES REVISITED
At this point, it seems worthwhile to compare our results for each subgroup and 
independent case examined with the premises of the different research 
perspectives outlined in the first section. We do accept the limitations of a small 
sample, yet we feel that evaluation of the findings from a theoretical point of view 
will contribute to our understanding of the situation.
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All research perspectives mentioned have mainly considered corporations 
that have gone public, and are owned by numerous individual and institutional 
investors. Accordingly, the shareholders, or their representatives, voice their 
opinion on the board, and the board decisions are executed by the CEO and 
other top managers. Usually the number of shareholders is high and even 
though the top managers may hold company shares, their stock ownership does 
not constitute a significant amount. In such corporations, the individual and 
institutional shareholders do not get involved in the day-to-day operations.
These perspectives have also focused on the short-term horizons of the 
investors which lead the top managers toward engagement in maximizing the 
profits in the short run. Related research has dealt with how this short-term 
orientation results in conflicting benefits for the managers and the corporation 
itself
Since the corporations we have studied are owned by a few major 
shareholders only, such problems do not come into the picture. Besides, the 
major shareholders not only hold board memberships, but are also involved in 
the daily operations. The dominance of the major shareholders become more 
significant within the holdings. Via the establishment of powerful Executive 
Committees, these owners undertake the duties of the managers in most 
instances.
SMALL FIRMS-ONE-MAN-DOMINATION
n / IA J O R
S H A R E H O L D E R
Figure 6. The Board Practices within the Small Firms.
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An extreme category considered includes the small firms studied. Since 
these firms are owned by a single major shareholder in most instances, the 
board is established as a legal necessity. Actually, all responsibilities of the 
board is taken over by a key person, who is both the owner and the manager 
(as shown in Figure 6). For such cases, talking about the board attributes and 
roles do not make much sense, since the performance of the firm is directly 
linked to the competence of the key person in pursuing the service, strategy
o n H  f_r*r\nfrr% ] rr»l<ac
The organizational age, firm size and the ownership structure can be listed as 
the major contingencies that lead to such a structure. Most of these small 
firms are young organizations lacking well-trained professional managers. 
However, the firm size enables proceeding with one-man domination. Usually 
the minority shareholders are members of the family and have been granted 
their shares just to fulfill the requirement for the minimum number of 
shareholders a corporation should have. Hence, they do not tend to interfere 
with the management of the company.
The observations listed above suggest that some aspects of the Legalistic 
Perspective can be used to explain the board practices within the small 
companies. As suggested by this perspective, the boards exist to undertake 
their legally mandated duties and do not get involved with strategy 
formulation. Besides, the two contingencies listed by this perspective, namely 
the firm size and ownership concentration have also been identified for the 
small firms we have studied. We have added the organizational age as a third 
contingency.
H O L D I N G  B O A R D S  
& 1C -1
T O G E T H E R  U N D E R T A K E
S E R V I C E
C O N T R O L
S T R A T E G Y
ROLES
Figure 7. The Board Practices within the Holding Companies & IC-1.
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In spite of the above parallelisms, discrepancies among the Legalistic 
Perspective claims and our findings exist. Firstly, although the board does not 
follow up with the daily activities, as also stated by this research perspective, the 
control role of the board remains very limited. Besides, the major shareholder 
acts as the CEO, who takes over all the board roles in most instances. Hence, we 
can conclude by claiming that a pseudo-legalistic perspective applies to the small 
firms.
® The Legalistic Perspective, on the other hand, can not be applied to other cases 
studied, since it claims that the boards do not mtertere with the daily activities of 
the corporation, but fulfill their legally mandated responsibilities. Such a 
description substantially contradicts with the board practices for the holding and 
subsidiary company boards examined. The major shareholders and the 
professional managers within the holding boards do deal with the daily activities 
of the corporation. As for the subsidiary companies, the general managers who 
are involved with the execution phase, serve on the boards in most cases. Figures 
7 and 8 depict the board practices within the holding and subsidiary companies, 
respectively. The Executive Committee depicted in Figure 8 belongs to the 
holding company, and a different (circular) notation is used for the company 
board to symbolize the informality embedded in both the board meetings and the 
overall functioning of this board.
S U B S I D I A R Y  C O M P A N Y  
B O A R D S
U N D E R T A K E S
S E R V I C E
C O N T R O L
S T R A T E G Y
R O L E S
Figure 8. The Board Practices within the Subsidiary Companies.
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The Legalistic Perspective does not mention the strategy role of the board. 
However, both the holding and joint venture boards, together with IC-1, IC-3 
and IC-4 boards engage with formulation of strategies. Therefore, the 
application of this perspective remains limited with the small firms only. Figure 9 
shows how the joint venture and IC-4 boards interact with the Executive 
Committee.
JOINT VENTURE 
BOARDS & IC-4
NDERTAKES 
SERVICE 
CONTROL 
TRATEGY 
ROLES
Figure 9. The Board Practices within the Joint Venture Companies & IC-4.
The Resource Dependence Perspective emphasizes the interaction of the board 
members with the outside world. This approach may fit to the board practices of 
IC-2, where the representative of the shareholder state bank utilizes the credible 
image and special links of this bank to secure resources and to create new 
business opportunities for the corporation. As mentioned before, the board 
structure and processing do not play a significant role for IC-2 management, 
since the burden rests on the shoulders of the Chairman and the general manager;
Similar points can be observed for the joint ventures, since the board members 
do use their special personal and organizational contacts with the parent 
companies to tie up resources for the company. The closeness of the board 
members to the government can be used to facilitate securing resources for IC-3.
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Similarly, the members of the IC-4 board, who occupy important positions within 
both the public and private organizations, also can contribute a good deal in 
enhancing the foundation’s interactions with its environment.
Nevertheless, the board structure and process should also be taken into account 
for these organizations, since these board attributes contribute to the performance 
of the strategy and control roles. The Resource Dependence Perspective falls 
short in this respect, since it totally ignores the structure and process dimensions.
Interorganizational interlocks, which constitute a major concern for the 
Resource Dependence Perspective, have not been frequently observed except for 
the group of companies orchestrated by a holding company. Intergroup 
interlocking among these subsidiary companies is very common in most 
instances. Although control seems to be the major motive behind such a 
structure, the interlocking facilitates the improvement of relationships and sharing 
of the resources among the companies.
The three contingencies identified by the Resource Dependence Perspective; 
external environment, company life cycle, and the type of the business, have not 
been recorded as major determinants for the cases covered. Nevertheless, 
closeness to the parent companies do enhance the manoeuvring capability of the 
joint ventures under ambiguous business environments.
The major flaw of the Class Hegemony Perspective lies in the priority attached 
to the ideological rationale as opposed to in-depth analysis (Zahra and Pearce, 
1989). The emphasis on wealth and power is too excessive to prevail over the 
objective evaluation of the current board practices. Due to these limitations, we 
choose not to elaborate on this perspective.
The basics of the Agency Theory stem from the separation df ownership, which 
donates the CEO and the senior management with considerable freedom and 
I power. As already mentioned, such is not the case for the corporations we have 
studied, since the initiative is held by the major shareholders. Only H-9 holding 
board does not include any owners and the management is left to the hands of the 
professionals. Nevertheless, no complaints on the mismatch between the 
management and corporation benefits have been raised during our interview.
Of the two contingencies specified by the Agency Theory; external 
environment and the ownership concentration, the second one has been a major 
determinant for the cases we have studied. The concentration of the ownership 
on fewer hands has shaped the board practices for the holdings, and the same 
contingency has substantially affected the management of the joint venture 
companies.
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Our analysis shows that not all board attributes are of equal importance for 
different corporations. For instance the stnicture and process attributes 
constitute cnicial aspects of the board functioning for the joint ventures, due to 
problems of absenteeism and the need for special arrangements to facilitate 
consensus. However, such attributes are of minor importance for the IC-2 
board, where the strategic decisions are taken by the Chairman and the general 
manager in most instances.
The board roles, on the other hand, can be delegated to a group (Executive 
Committee, for instance), or a single person (as in the case of small firms). In 
some instances, there is non-uniformity among the board members’ authorities, 
which, in turn, prevents full involvement. For instance, the outsider board 
members of H-1 are not allowed to involve in strategy formulation.
The nature and the influence of the contingencies also vary with the 
organization considered. For instance, the style and mentality of the major 
shareholders might be a major determinant for the organization of the board 
practices for the holding boards, since it directly affects the level of authority 
delegated. The same contingency might not be that significant for the joint 
venture boards, since the board members tend to be professional managers rather 
than owners in most instances.
Figure 10. Application of the Integrative Model to the Small Firms.
72
r e la o o n s h i p
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p a r tn e r s
Figure 11. Application of the Integrative Model to the Joint Ventures.
External contingencies like the tendency of the individual shareholders to 
voice their opinion on the boards, or the employees’ search for having a word- 
of-say at the company’ management have not been recorded as major 
determinants for the cases covered. Only for the joint ventures, the legal 
environment has been observed as a major factor due to the problem with the 
alternate membership, and hence included into the model.
We still believe that the elements of the Integrative Model can act as useful 
guidelines in facilitating analysis, provided that the content and the relative 
importance of each element of the model is explicitly identified. Figures 10-13 
show how the Integrative Model can be applied to the small firms, joint 
ventures, holdings, and subsidiary companies, respectively. Note that only the 
most significant contingencies are included in order to emphasize our argument 
above the change in the nature and degree of influence of these contingencies.
The ownership concentration and the external environment (including the 
legal environment) have defined as contingencies by the Agency Theoiy. For 
the joint venture boards, we also include the status (whether the joint venture is 
a permanent or project-based) and the relationship among the partners (as an 
indicator of compatibility, consensus, accommodative attitude, etc.).
For both the holdings and the subsidiary companies, we include the expertise 
and tenure of the top management team, since the owners report that they are 
willing to delegate more authority in the presence of an experienced team of
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senior executives. For the holdings, we also account for the mentality and style 
of the major shareholders’ since the owners’ penetration of power to lower 
levels of management and the authority delegated to the professionals and 
outsiders tend to be influenced by this factor.
The type of the business is also considered as a major contingency for the 
subsidiary companies because the involvement of the major shareholders tends 
to be high if the activities of a subsidiary company can be categorized as a core 
business for the holding. Note that though the Resource Dependence 
Perspective uses “type of the business” as a major contingency, the meaning i
attached is quite different from our definition.'  ^ . i
In addition to these variations among the contingencies, tlie most striking 
differences among the board attributes and the roles are also depicted in Figures 
10 13·. The process attribute, for instance, does not constitute a significant' I ,
concern for the small firms! yet it acts as the key attribute for the joint venture 
companies. Similarly, the control role is taken very seriously by the joint 
venture boards, whereas its execution is severely limited for the sihall firms and 
the holding companies, since the owners are the managers at the same time.
Figure 12. Application of the Integrative Model to the Holding Companies.
Please note that these applications of the Integrative Model tend tp reflect the 
commonalties observed among the elements of each group. Nevertheless, the 
board practices of a single company within a subgroup can show deviations
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from what we have come up for that subgroup. For instance, since 8 out Of 9 
holding boards include major shareholders, we choose to emphasize that 
property, although there are no shareholder members serving on the H-9 board. 
Naturally, the characteristics of each subgroup will get more apparent as similar 
research is conducted using large sample sizes.
Figure 13. Application of the Integrative Model to the Subsidiary Companies.
IX. CONCLUSION & FUTURE RESEARCH POINTERS
The results of our study have been listed and evaluated in the previous section.
I
Nevertheless, our interpretations are based on the sample examined, and hence 
the findings of this research can not be safely generalized to include all similar 
corporations. Yet, the accumulated knowledge and expertise can lea4 to the 
generation of some hypotheses that can be checked by an extensive study in the 
future. Below, we provide a list of these research hypotheses. Since the rationale 
behind these items Have already been provided in the previous sections, no further 
explanations are attached to them.
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n> A significant majority of the holding boards include the major 
shareholder(s) as memberis).
^  Insiders tend to domir ate the holding boards.
=> Insiders at the holding boards consist of major shareholders, current or ex­
top managers.
=> Most owners do not believe in the possible contribution of the outsiders, 
since they think that the outsiders do not have enough time to allocate for 
deahng with the company activities.
=> Expertise in finance, law, and/or economics, together with a well-preserved 
public image tend to constitute the major ehgibihty criteria for the outsiders. 
Outsiders’ affiliation with the major shareholders of the corporation tend to 
play a major role in their eligibihty for board membership.
The level of managerial and technical expertise nested in the holding boards 
is high.
=> Executive Committees that are mostly composed of the major shareholders 
and the leading professional managers, play a significant role in the strategy 
formulation and implementation phases.
=> All or the majority of the members of the Executive Committees established 
are the members of the holding board as well.
=> Major shareholders tend to hold membership positions at the boards of the 
companies within the group.
^  In most cases, the general managers are allowed to hold board 
memberships.
=> Of all companies within the group, joint ventures tend to have more formal 
board proceedings compared to the companies owned by the holding only.
=> Intergroup interlocks tend to be used frequently as a means for coordination 
among the member companies.
The service role of the holding boards is usually undertaken by the major 
shareholder(s).
Major shareholders tend to use their memberships within the boards of the 
companies in the group as a means of estabhshing control.
The contribution of the outsiders tend to be restricted to consultancy only, 
whereas the strategy role of the board is executed by the major 
shareholders.
Hypotheses Concerning the Holding Companies:
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=> Joint ventures tend to have powerful Executive Committees.
=> Alternate membership is a common practice adopted by joint venture 
boards to hedge against absenteeism.
=i> The composition of the board and the voting system is designed to facilitate 
consensus.
=> Board meetings are formal with well-defined program.
=> The service role is executed by the contribution of the directors, all of 
which have high managerial and technical expertise.
=> The general managers are not members of the board (in most cases).
Hypotheses Concerning the Small Firms:
=> These firms ire basically family businesses, disguised in the corporation 
identity.
=> The board consists of the shareholders only. In most instances, the founder 
gives minority shares to his family and relatives, so that the legal 
requirement for the existence of a minimum of five shareholders will be 
fiilfilled.
=> The general manager position is occupied by the major shareholder.
There are no/v iiy few professional managers. Mostly due to the age of the 
organization, qualified personnel has not been prepared yet.
=> The existence of the board arises from a perfunctory need to fulfill the legal 
requirements.
No formal board meetings are held.
We strongly recommend that the conductors of future research pursue with 
face to face interviews and open ended questions. This method not only enables 
the interviewer to bring clarification to certain questions, but also facilitates the 
discovery of undercover issues of concern which have not been taken into 
consideration in advance. Besides, face to face interviews enable obtaining the 
data directly from its main source, compared to questionnaires which may have 
been filled out by assistants or secretaries, and not necessarily by the board 
members.
However, once the major features of a subgroup is determined and the test 
questions are modified and validated, the researchers can engage in distributing
Hypotheses Concerning the Joint Ventures:
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questionnaires. Within this framework, the use of questionnaires will provide the 
means to access a larger number of board members.
Naturally, the scope of the research should be extended to include other 
subgroups. As the study unfolds, other classifications may be made to overrule 
the ones defined in this paper. Enterprises where majority of the shares are held 
by the state, foundations, corporations whose shares are traded on the Istanbul 
Stock Exchange might constitute interesting research samples. More over, the 
subsidiary companies of different holdings can be examined in detail, to compare 
and contrast the board practices.
We also recommend the inclusion of the performance dimension into the 
analysis. As explained in the previous sections, the changing board attributes, 
roles and contingencies can be examined over a time horizon to uncover the 
nature of the relationships among these elements and the corporate performance. 
It might also be interesting to compare different subgroups based on the level of 
dynamism observed in these elements. Holding companies, owned by one or two 
families, for instance, might be expected to show a more static pattern in their 
board attributes and roles, compared to the joint ventures whose ownership 
structure has shown significant changes over the years (like JV-1).
The reluctance of the board members to comment on the specifics of the board 
processes also creates serious doubts about their expected eagerness to answer 
questions relating to the corporate performance. At this point, we suggest that 
special care should I e given to how the interview questions are phrased (or the 
questionnaires are prepared). Since process and performance related issues touch 
to the very crucial links and balances of power within the corporations, the board 
members are likely to refrain from commenting on these issues, and their 
responses may not always reflect the whole picture, resulting in a bias and 
disorientation of the research findings.
With sincere belief in the significance of the topic, we hope that the findings of 
this pilot study will arise the curiosity of the interested parties and lead to the 
initiation of more extensive research projects.
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TABLE 1. SCOPE OF THE MAJOR BUSINESS ACTIVITIES OF THE 
SELECTED HOLDINGS
HOLDING NAME BUSINESSES HEADQUARTERS
H-1
Pharmaceuticals, Buildinc 
Materials, Paper 
Products, Investment & 
Securities, Welding  
Electrodes, Finance, 
Insurance, Information 
Systems, Market 
Research, Foreign Trade
I
ISTANBUL
H-2
Manufacturing, 
Turn-key Projects, 
Construction, Finance, 
Tourism
ISTANBUL
H-3
Financial Services, 
Tourism, 
Media
ISTANBUL
H-4
Petroleum,
Tourism,
Ship Building, 
Financial Services, Food
ISTANBUL
H-5
Publishing, Media, 
Automotive, Banking, 
Insurance,
Trade,
Tourism
ISTANBUL
H-6
Construction, Machinery 
& Erection, Textiles 
& Chemicals, 
Prefabricated Housing
ISTANBUL
H-7
Petroleum,
Trade,
Construction,
Manufacturing,
Services
ANKARA
H-8
Tourism,
Health,
Commerce,
Insurance
ANKARA
H-9
Machinery,
Construction,
Defence,
Electricity,
Communication
ISTANBUL
TABLE II. COMPARISON OF THE HOLDING COMPANIES BASED ON THE BOARD ATTRIBUTES
HOLDING NAME H-1 H-2 H-3
HOLDING BOARDS
No.of Board Members 8 8 3
No. of Outsiders 4 0 0
Occupations of Outsiders professors N/A N/A
Affiliation with Company Owner? acquaintance N/A N/A
Role of the Outsiders consultant N/A N/A
Opinion About Outsiders can provide professional advice can not allocate enough time can not allocate enough time
Owner Representation (No. of Family Members) 4 2 2
Identity of Insiders owners owners/professlonal managers owners/professional manager
Criteria for Outsiders reputatlon/knowledge/experlence N/A N/A
Level of Managerial and Technical Expertise of the Board high high high
Degree of Board's Involvement in Company Activities full full partial
Coordinator? no yes but in the technical sense no
Executive Committee? yes yes-very powerful no
Level of Penetration of Owner Influence to Company Boards very high normal very high
Nature of Board Meetings formal executive committee prevails formal
HOLDING NAME H-1 H-2 H-3
COMPANY BOARDS
General Manager? in in in
Outsiders? no except JVs only in case of partnership no
Formal Board Meetings? yes yes yes
Owners' Membership yes no chairman of all boards
Internal Interlocks very common very common very common
TABLE II. COMPARISON OF THE HOLDING COMPANIES BASED ON THE BOARD ATTRIBUTES
HOLDING NAME H-4 H-5 H-6
HOLDING BOARDS
No.of Board Members 7 9 7
No. of Outsiders 3 0 0
Occupations of Outsiders 2 professors/1 bank ovwier N/A N/A
Affiliation with Company Owner? yes-friendship N/A N/A
Role of the Outsiders contribute as much as Insiders N/A N/A
Opinion About Outsiders contribute a lot may contribute do not contribute much
Owner Representation (No. of Family Members) 3 2 4
Identity of Insiders owners/professional manager owner/professlonal managers owners/ex-managers
Criteria for Outsiders background/affiliation N/A N/A
Level of Managerial and Technical Expertise of the Board high high high
Degree of Board's Involvement in Company Activities full full full
Coordinator? yes yes removed
Executive Committee? no yes removed
Level of Penetration of Owner Influence to Company Boards normal normal normal
Nature of Board Meetings formal executive committee prevails forma -general issues
HOLDING NAME H^ H-5 H-6
COMPANY BOARDS
General Manager? in in in
Outsiders? none only In case of partnership none
Formal Board Meetings? yes yes-absolutely mostly on paper
Owners' Membership yes-common only in large companies very rare
Internal Interlocks rare-deliberatefy avoided rare very common
TABLE II. COMPARISON OF THE HOLDING COMPANIES BASED ON THE BOARD ATTRIBUTES
HOLDING NAME H-7 H-8 H-9
HOLDING BOARDS
No.of Board Members 4 10 7
No. of Outsiders 0 0 7
Occupations of Outsiders N/A N/A professorsAop managers
Affiliation with Company Owner? N/A N/A nothing special
Role of the Outsiders N/A N/A strategy formulal ion/coordination/control
Opinion About Outsiders do not contribute much can do some lobbying contribute a lot without interfering with execution
Owner Representation (No. of Family Members) 4 10 0
Identity of Insiders owners owners N/A
Criteria for Outsiders N/A N/A expertise in finance and law
Level of Managerial and Technical Expertise of the Board limited to those of a key member high-delegation exists high
Degree of Board's Involvement in Company Activities partial full full
Coordinator? no yes yes-for bureaucratic work
Executive Committee? very powerful yes not for the holding but for the co.'s
Level of Penetration of O w ner Influence to Company Boards high high normal-minimum
Nature of Board Meetings very informal formal formal
HOLDING NAME H-7 H-8 H-8
COMPANY BOARDS
General Manager? in In out
Outsiders? only in JV  boards none professional managers
Formal Board Meetings? mostly on paper yes but directed from above yes
Owners' Membership none yes-based on related experience no-deliberateiy av^oided
Internal Interlocks very common only among related businesses common- but a limit exists
TABLE III. COMPARISON OF THE JOINT VENTURE BOARDS BASED ON THE BOARD ATTRIBUTES
JV-1 JV-2 JV-3
Status company company project
Nationality of Partner Germany Saudi Arabia United States
Majority of Shares are Held by partner partner 50-50-Turkish firm leads________
Board? yes yes no
Executive Committee yes yes yes
Authority of the Executive Committee all except the non-transferable rights of the board follows the action plan replaces the board
Hedge against Absenteeism alternate members alternate members one vote for each company
Alternate Mem bers for foreign members foreign & Turkish partners N/A
Measures Taken to Facilitate Consensus voting system decreasing the board size-proposed leading firm/referee system
Difficulty in Gathering Board Members? yes yes yes
Formal Meetings? yes yes yes
W ell-defined Program? yes yes yes
General Managers' Board Membership no general manager position no-attends to report N/A- project manager reports
TABLE IV. COMPARISON OF THE HOLDING COMPANIES BASED ON THE BOARD ROLES
HOLDINGS ROLES
SERVICE CONTROL STRATEGY
H-1 yes-family name & prestige yes-via the Executive Commitee/self-control partial-outsiders are excluded
H-2 yes-major shareholders' accountability yes-via the Executive Commitee/self-control yes-shared by owners & professionals
H-3 yes-owners' personal credibility & contacts yes-owner's membership in all boards partial-rests upon the sole owner
H^ yes-family name & prestige yes-some owners' membership in crucial boards yes-shared by insiders & outsiders
H-5 yes-owners' personal credibility & contacts yes-some owners' membership In crucial boards yes-shared by insidejrs & outsiders
H-6 yes-major shareholders' accountability limited-general managers posses considerable authority yes-shared by owners & professionals
H-7 yes-owners' personal credibility & contacts limited-mutual Interaction between general manager & owner partial-rests upon the sole owner
H-8 yes-major shareholders' accountability yes-owners' business assignments yes-shared by all members(owners)
H-9 yes-vast expertise in finance & law yes- for overall conformance check/rest Is delegated to co. boards yes-shared by all members(non-owner outsiders)
TA B LE  V . C O M P A R IS O N  O F T H E  J V S  B AS ED  ON TH E  BOARD ROLES
JO IN T  V E N T U R E S R O LES
S E R V IC E C O N TR O L S TR A TE G Y
JV-1 yes-technical & managerial experience somewhat-via the Executive Committee yes-shared by members of both nations
JV -2 yes-business contacts of Saudian shareholders limited-general manager's reporting to the board yes-shared by members of both nations
JV -3 yes-experlence&affiliation with other co.'s yes-site visits yes-shared by members of both nations
T A B LE  V I. E V A LU A TIO N  O F T H E  S M A L L  F IR M S  AND IC-'S  B ASED  ON TH E  BO ARD RO LES
S M A L L  F IR M S R O LES
S E R V IC E C O N T R O L S T R A T E G Y
A LL yes-owners' personal credibility & contacts no-one man show partlal-usually rests upon one person
IN D E P E N D E N T  C A S E S R O LES
S E R V IC E C O N T R O L S T R A T E G Y
IC-1 yes-maJor shareholders' accountability yes-owners' board assignments yes-shared by all members(owners)
IC -2 yes-shareholder bank's credibility & contacts llmited-on the shoulders of the Chairman of the board partial-rests uponChairman and general manager
IC ^ yes-affiliation of members with government limited-especially with board membership of general manager yes-nonnegligible government Influence
IC ^ yes- positions and authority of the members limited-trust for the members of the Executive Committee yes-shared by all members
TABLE VII. EVALUATION OF IC-1 BASED ON THE BOARD ATTRIBUTES
CORE BUSINESS BOARD IC-1
No.of Board Members 5
No. of Outsiders 0
Occupations of Outsiders N/A
Affiliation with Company Owner? N/A
Role of the Outsiders N/A
Opinion About Outsiders do not contribute much
Owner Representation (No. of Family Members) 5 individual owners
Identity of Insiders owners
Criteria for Outsiders N/A
Level of Managerial and Technical Expertise of the Board high
Degree of Board’s Involvement In Company Activities full
Coordinator? yes but in the technical sense
Executive Committee? yes
Level of Penetration of Owner Influence to Company Boards normal-high
Nature of Board Meetings formal
COMPANY BOARDS IC-1
General Manager? out
Outsiders? none
Formal Board Meetings? yes
Owners' Membership yes- two owners on each board
Internal Interlocks common (for owners only)
